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NATURAL LAW AND THE RHETORIC OF 
EMPIRE: REYNOLDS V. UNITED STATES, 
POLYGAMY, AND IMPERIALISM 
NATHAN B. OMAN

 
ABSTRACT 
In 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court construed the Free Exercise Clause 
for the first time, holding in Reynolds v. United States that Congress could 
punish Mormon polygamy. Historians have interpreted Reynolds, and the 
anti-polygamy legislation and litigation that it midwifed, as an extension 
of Reconstruction into the American West. This Article offers a new 
historical interpretation, one that places the birth of Free Exercise 
jurisprudence in Reynolds within an international context of Great Power 
imperialism and American international expansion at the end of the 
nineteenth century. It does this by recovering the lost theory of religious 
freedom that the Mormons offered in Reynolds, a theory grounded in the 
natural law tradition. It then shows how the Court rejected this theory by 
using British imperial law to interpret the scope of the First Amendment. 
Unraveling the work done by these international analogies reveals how 
the legal debates in Reynolds reached back to natural law theorists of the 
seventeenth century, such as Hugo Grotius, and forward to fin de siècle 
imperialists, such as Theodore Roosevelt. By analogizing the federal 
government to the British Raj, Reynolds provided a framework for 
national politicians in the 1880s to employ the supposedly discredited 
tactics of Reconstruction against the Mormons. Embedded in imperialist 
analogies, Reynolds and its progeny thus formed a prelude to the 
constitutional battles over American imperialism in the wake of the 
Spanish-American War. These constitutional debates reached their 
denouement in the Insular Cases, where Reynolds and its progeny 
appeared not as Free Exercise cases but as precedents on the scope of 
 
 
  Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School. I am particularly grateful to Sally Gordon 
for her help with this project. She is a scholar of rare talents and has been a generous friend and mentor 
to me. I would also like to thank Morris Sheppard Arnold, Christina Burnett, Claudia Bushman, Josh 
Chafetz, Dave Douglas, Michael Dorf, Mary Dudziak, Chad Flanders, Spencer Fluhman, Terryl 
Givens, Vivian Hamilton, Paul Horwitz, Chris Jones, Gerard Magliocca, Solangel Maldonado, Paul 
Reeve, Steven D. Smith, Michael Stein, Bill Van Alstyne, Tim Zick, and participants in a workshop at 
Cornell Law School and a panel at the Mormon History Association for helpful comments. The 
standard disclaimers apply. As always, I thank Heather. 
  
 
 
 
 
662 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:661 
 
 
 
 
American imperial power. This Article thus remaps key events in late-
nineteenth-century constitutional history, showing how the birth of Free 
Exercise jurisprudence in Reynolds must be understood as part of 
America’s engagement with Great Power imperialism and the ideologies 
that sustained it.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 6, 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision 
in Reynolds v. United States.
1
 The decision affirmed the bigamy 
conviction of George Reynolds, a Mormon polygamist. In doing so, the 
Court for the first time construed the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment,
2
 earning Reynolds a place in the constitutional 
law canon.
3
 Reading the case in historical context, however, reveals it as 
 
 
 1. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 2. Prior to its incorporation against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Free 
Exercise Clause applied only to action by the federal government. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause prohibits state 
governments from abridging the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment). During the 
course of the nineteenth century, cases reached the Supreme Court from state courts alleging violations 
of the Free Exercise clause, and, in each of these cases, the Court ruled that the First Amendment did 
not apply to the states. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Permoli, 44 U.S. 589, 606 (1845) (holding 
that the Free Exercise Clause did not apply to activities of the states). See generally Michael W. 
McConnell, The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on Religious-Cultural-
Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7 (2002) (discussing pre-Reynolds church-
state cases). 
 3. For a modern overview of the discussion of Reynolds, see MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. 
DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 186–96 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing Reynolds 
v. United States and later polygamy cases); MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS 
C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 139–42 (2002) (same); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & 
EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 
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far more than a hoary chestnut from the birth of Free Exercise 
jurisprudence. Legal historians have tended to place Reynolds in the 
context of what came immediately before it.
4
 Sarah Barringer Gordon, for 
example, has persuasively demonstrated the deep affinities between the 
anti-polygamy jurisprudence
5
 midwifed by Reynolds and the anti-slavery 
movement.
6
 In her telling, Reynolds is an extension of the constitutional 
debates sparked by abolitionism, debates dominated by domestic 
narratives of federal versus local power and the social preconditions for 
American democracy.
7
 The decision in Reynolds, however, also drew on 
international narratives, using analogies to British imperial law to interpret 
 
 
ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 289–307 (2001) (same). In addition, the case 
remains a staple in the teaching of constitutional law. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE 
AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS 991–95 (3d 
ed. 2002) (placing the Reynolds case at the beginning of the Free Exercise chapter). The discussion of 
Reynolds in the law reviews has also been extensive. See, e.g., Todd M. Gillett, The Absolution of 
Reynolds: The Constitutionality of Religious Polygamy, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497 (2000) 
(arguing that Reynolds should be overturned); Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar People: 
Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-
Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295 (1998) (criticizing Reynolds); Shayna M. Sigman, 
Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy is Wrong, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (2006); 
Richard A. Vazquez, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate 
Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 225 (2001) (arguing for the continuing vitality of Reynolds). 
 4. See EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A 
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830–1900, at 151–59 
(1988) (discussing Reynolds v. United States within the context of Mormon legal history); SARAH 
BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 119–45 (2002) (discussing Reynolds v. United States within the 
context of nineteenth-century legal thought); Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay’s Horses: The Federal 
Response to Mormon Polygamy, 1854–1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29 (2001) (discussing the 
history of anti-polygamy laws and the Reynolds case); Ray Jay Davis, Plural Marriage and Religious 
Freedom: The Impact of Reynolds v. United States, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 287 (1973); Sarah Barringer 
Gordon, ―Our National Hearthstone‖: Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the Sentimental Campaign Against 
Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (1996) (discussing the anti-
polygamy politics leading to Reynolds); Orma Lindford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy 
Cases, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308 (1964) (discussing the history of Reynolds and the other anti-polygamy 
cases).  
 5. See United States v. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 150 U.S. 
145 (1893); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 140 U.S. 
665 (1891); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 
(1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Ex Parte Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887); Cannon v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885); Clawson v. United States, 114 U.S. 477 (1885); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 
U.S. 15 (1885); Clawson v. United States, 113 U.S. 143 (1885); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 
(1880). 
 6. See GORDON, supra note 4, at 55–83 (discussing the relationship between anti-polygamy 
jurisprudence and the anti-slavery movements). 
 7. See id. at 6–7 (summarizing strands of argument in the anti-polygamy battles and how they 
contributed to the founding of First Amendment jurisprudence); see also Nathan B. Oman, The Story 
of a Forgotten Battle, 2002 BYU L. REV. 745 (reviewing Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon 
Question, and summarizing her key arguments). 
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the scope of the First Amendment. This Article unravels the work done by 
these international analogies, revealing how the legal debates in Reynolds 
reached back to natural law theorists of the seventeenth century, such as 
Samuel Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius, and forward to fin de siècle 
imperialists, such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. At the 
center of this debate lay the Mormons, who were defined by nineteenth-
century Americans as not only religious but also racial—and thus 
imperial—outsiders. 
The Court heard oral arguments in Reynolds in November 1878.
8
 
Reconstructing the now-forgotten theory of the First Amendment 
advanced by the Mormons‘ lawyers shows that the Mormons had a 
nuanced account of religious freedom quite different than the caricature 
attributed to them by the Court‘s opinion. Contrary to the common 
perception, they did not claim that the Free Exercise Clause was a trump 
card exempting any religiously motivated action—regardless of its 
nature—from the criminal law. Rather, they sought to provide a workable 
theory of religious freedom that defined those religious actions entitled to 
constitutional protection and those acts that could be criminalized 
regardless of their religious motivation.
9
 Their argument hinged on the 
distinction between actions that are mala in se versus merely mala 
prohibita.
10
 The First Amendment, they claimed, protected only 
criminalized religious acts that were mala prohibita but did not extend to 
acts that were mala in se.
11
 Acts could be sorted into one category rather 
than the other by appeal to a series of arguments drawn from the natural 
law tradition, arguments that depended on analogies to non-Western legal 
systems.
12
  
The Court‘s implicit response to the natural law reasoning of the 
Mormons‘ lawyers in Reynolds was an appeal to the nineteenth-century 
ideals of progress and imperialism that were displacing the earlier, 
eighteenth-century ideals of universal reason and natural law.
13
 The 
Justices analogized Mormons to ―the Asiatic and African races‖14 that, at 
the time, were being subjected to the supposedly benign and progressive 
influence of imperial legal systems. They went on to implicitly liken the 
 
 
 8. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 116 (2002) 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. See infra Part I.B. 
 11. See infra Part I.B. 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 150 (1878). 
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federal government to the British Raj, bringing civilization through law to 
a benighted race.
15
 It is well known that in the wake of the Spanish-
American War in 1898, American legal thinkers turned to imperial models 
abroad for analogies with which to interpret the U.S. Constitution, 
culminating in the Supreme Court‘s 1901 decisions in the Insular Cases.16 
Historians have also increasingly rejected an exceptionalist interpretation 
of the United States‘ expansion across North America, seeing it instead as 
a local manifestation of the international spread of imperial ambitions in 
the nineteenth century.
17
 A fuller understanding of Reynolds reveals how 
the apparently domestic battles over polygamy from the 1860s to the 
1880s were also part of this international story of American imperial 
expansion, forming a legal prelude to its constitutional denouement in the 
Insular Cases.  
The Court‘s racial analogy also foreshadowed the aggressive legal 
tactics employed against the Mormons in the wake of Reynolds. 
Originally, anti-polygamy politics was associated with anti-slavery 
Republicanism.
18
 By the late 1870s, however, the federal government had 
abandoned African Americans to the tender mercies of newly resurgent 
state governments in the South in return for national reconciliation and an 
end to the bitter sectional politics surrounding the Civil War.
19
 In 
Reynolds, the Court adopted the rhetorical roadmap that allowed 
Republicans in the decade after the decision to employ the tactics of 
Reconstruction against the Mormons without reopening the bitter political 
battles of the late-1860s.
20
 It did this by associating the suppression of 
polygamy with the control—rather than the liberation—of racial 
minorities, a stance that allowed the condemnation of polygamy without 
an implicit condemnation of the emerging system of postemancipation 
 
 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (discussing the legal 
debates over imperialism sparked by the Spanish-American War); JAMES EDWARD KERR, THE 
INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM (1982) (discussing the 
constitutional debates over the status of the territory acquired from Spain in the Spanish-American 
War); BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 
(2006) (same). 
 17. See, e.g., DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, UNION, NATION, OR EMPIRE: THE AMERICAN DEBATE 
OVER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1789–1941 (2009). 
 18. The most dramatic pairing of the two came in the 1856 Republican Party Platform, which 
called for the exclusion of the ―twin relics of barbarism‖—slavery and polygamy—from the territories. 
See C. Peter Magrath, Chief Justice Waite and the ―Twin Relic‖: Reynolds v. United States, 18 VAND. 
L. REV. 507, 518 (1965) (quoting the 1856 Republican platform). 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
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racial subordination in the South.
21
 While historians rightly tend to 
interpret the federal government‘s anti-polygamy crusade in the 1880s as 
an extension of Reconstruction into the West, the interplay of natural law 
and imperialism in Reynolds reveals the way that crusade also acted as a 
prelude to imperial adventures at the turn of the century.
22
 Indeed, the 
rhetorical association of anti-polygamy with imperialism abroad rather 
than Reconstruction at home was part of what made employing the 
unpopular legal tactics of Reconstruction in Utah palatable to national 
politicians in the 1880s.
23
  
All of these rhetorical moves were part of a much deeper intellectual 
shift that occurred over the course of the nineteenth century. Writing a 
generation ago, Christopher Lasch captured that shift in terms of the fault 
line running through the debates over American expansion after the 
Spanish-American War of 1898: 
[American imperialists] substituted for the Jeffersonian proposition 
that the right to liberty is ―natural‖—hence universal—the 
proposition that rights depend on environment: on ―civilization,‖ of 
which there were now seen to be many stages of development; on 
race; even on climate. A pseudo-Darwinian hierarchy of cultural 
stages, unequal in the capacity for enjoyment of the rights 
associated with self-government, replaced the simpler and more 
liberal theory of the Enlightenment, which recognized only the 
distinction between society and nature. ―Rights,‖ as absolutes, lost 
their meaning by becoming relative to time and place. Rights now 
depended on a people‘s ―readiness‖ to enjoy them.24 
A recovery of the lost debates over natural law and imperialism in 
Reynolds shows this shift from Enlightenment reason to nineteenth-
 
 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See generally ROBERT JOSEPH DWYER, THE GENTILE COMES TO UTAH: A STUDY IN 
RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: 1862–1890 (1971) (discussing the place of ―The Mormon 
Question‖ in post–Civil War politics); GORDON, supra note 4 (same); GUSTIVE O. LARSON, THE 
―AMERICANIZATION‖ OF UTAH FOR STATEHOOD (1971) (same); EDWARD LEO LYMAN, POLITICAL 
DELIVERANCE: THE MORMON QUEST FOR UTAH STATEHOOD (1986) (same); W. Paul Reeve, Address 
at the Western History Association Conference: Reconstructing the West: James M. Ashley‘s Answer 
to the Mormon Question (Oct. 2007) (discussing the politics of Reconstruction in the West). 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE WORLD OF NATIONS: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN HISTORY, 
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 73 (1973). Interestingly, in the chapter immediately preceding his discussion 
of the arguments over imperialism and anti-imperialism in the wake of the Spanish-American War, 
Lasch has a prolonged discussion of Mormonism in which he fails to recognize the connection 
between the anti-Mormon crusades of the 1880s and the debates over imperialism a decade later. See 
id. at 56–69 (discussing the place of Mormonism in American history). 
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century progress playing out in the hard-fought anti-polygamy battles of 
the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I recounts the birth of the 
Reynolds litigation and the natural law arguments that the Mormons‘ 
lawyers offered before the Supreme Court. Part II shows how the Court 
used the rhetoric of imperialism to reject those arguments, tapping into 
international narratives of racial hierarchy and the progress of civilization. 
Part III reconstructs the afterlife of the imperial analogies in Reynolds, 
showing first how they formed a bridge between the decline of Radical 
Reconstruction and the anti-polygamy crusade of the 1880s, and second 
how Reynolds prefigured the constitutional analogies to British 
imperialism in the debates over American expansion at the end of the 
1890s that ultimately culminated in the 1901 Insular Cases. 
I. MORMON POLYGAMY AND NATURAL LAW AT THE SUPREME COURT 
To see how a fuller understanding of Reynolds recasts standard 
narratives about the politics of polygamy and the role of imperialism in 
late-nineteenth-century constitutional interpretation, we must first 
reconstruct the litigation that led to the decision. This allows us to recover 
the now-forgotten theory of religious freedom put before the Court in 
1878, a theory grounded in the natural law tradition and based on a series 
of analogies to non-Western legal systems. 
A. The Origins of the Reynolds Litigation 
In 1847, Mormon refugees under church leader Brigham Young arrived 
in the wastes of the Great Basin, fleeing more than a decade of intermittent 
mob violence in the East.
25
 At the time, what would become Utah was 
beyond the borders of the United States in Mexico. In 1848, however, 
Mexico ceded the entire region to a victorious United States under the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and, in 1850, Congress created the territory 
of Utah to govern the newly conquered community.
26
 By 1852, Mormon 
 
 
 25. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 726–31 (2009) (discussing the Mormon migration in the late 1840s). The 
migration occurred in two stages. In 1846, the Mormons established a settlement in present day 
Nebraska on the far western border of the United States. In 1847, they began moving the people in this 
settlement to their final destination in the Great Basin. See generally RICHARD E. BENNETT, WE‘LL 
FIND THE PLACE: THE MORMON EXODUS, 1846–1848 (1997) (discussing the Mormon migration to the 
American west). 
 26. See LYMAN, supra note 22, at 7–40 (discussing the establishment of the Utah Territory in 
1850). 
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leaders felt confident enough in their independence to publicly announce 
the doctrine of plural marriage, which had been practiced clandestinely by 
elite Mormons for over a decade, and went so far as to send a high church 
leader to Washington, D.C., to preach the doctrine.
27
  
Four years later, in the 1856 presidential election, the Republican Party 
burst on the national scene dedicated to the eradication of ―the twin relics 
of barbarism‖ in the territories: slavery and polygamy.28 By 1862, the 
Republicans were in control of Congress and passed their first anti-
polygamy law, the Morrill Act.
29
 The law, however, was ineffective, and 
an attempt to prosecute Brigham Young ended in failure when the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that federal officials had exceeded their authority in 
order to bring the case.
30
 Congress responded in 1874 with the Poland Act, 
which firmly placed criminal prosecution in Utah in non-Mormon hands.
31
 
However, the willingness of Utah jurors to find Mormons guilty of a crime 
for ―living their religion‖ and the constitutionality of the Morrill Act‘s 
prohibition on polygamy under the Free Exercise Clause remained in 
doubt.
32
  
Both federal officials and Mormon leaders wanted to test the validity of 
the Morrill Act. The Mormons wished to vindicate their belief that the law 
was unconstitutional, and federal officials jaded by years of unsuccessful 
legal wrangling against church leaders were eager to grasp any opportunity 
to prosecute a high-profile polygamy case and lay Mormon arguments to 
rest.
33
 In addition, George Q. Cannon, one of Young‘s counselors and the 
political mastermind of Mormon resistance, turned to the law as part of a 
high-stakes political game in Congress.
34
 As Utah‘s nonvoting territorial 
 
 
 27. See Orson Pratt, Celestial Marriage, in 1 J. DISCOURSES 53 (1854–1886) (the sermon 
publicly announcing polygamy); see also BRECK ENGLAND, THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF ORSON 
PRATT 175–76 (1985) (discussing Orson Pratt‘s mission to Washington, D.C., after the announcement 
of polygamy); RICHARD VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 84 (3d ed. 1992) (same). 
The most detailed account of the lived experience of nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy is 
KATHRYN M. DAYNES, MORE WIVES THAN ONE: TRANSFORMATION OF THE MORMON MARRIAGE 
SYSTEM, 1840–1910 (2001). 
 28. See Magrath, supra note 18, at 518 (quoting the 1856 Republican platform). 
 29. See id. at 520. 
 30. See generally Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434 (1872) (declaring that grand juries in the 
Utah Territory had been illegally impanelled using the procedure for Article III courts rather than the 
procedure for Territorial courts); FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 138 (discussing how 
Englebrecht ended the prosecution of Brigham Young). 
 31. See FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 148–49. The Poland Act did this by giving 
control over juries to the federally appointed (and non-Mormon) U.S. Marshal rather than the locally 
appointed (and Mormon) Territorial Marshal. See id. 
 32. See GORDON, supra note 4, at 83 (discussing the ineffectiveness of the Morrill Act). 
 33. See id. at 111–16 (discussing the maneuvering that led to the Reynolds litigation). 
 34. See id. at 149. 
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delegate, Cannon fought in Washington, D.C., to delay new proposals 
dealing with ―The Mormon Question‖ and hoped to create a favorable 
Supreme Court precedent.
35
 For their part, federal officials in Utah 
despaired of ever enforcing the anti-polygamy laws because, as one Utah 
lawyer put it in a letter to the Attorney General, ―[t]he sympathy of the 
great mass of the people here is with the parties to be prosecuted.‖36 A deal 
was struck: Mormon leaders would provide a defendant for a test case.
37
 
Cannon picked a loyal English convert—and recently married 
polygamist—named George Reynolds, and the Mormons provided the 
federal prosecutors with a list of witnesses.
38
 
On October 23, 1874, Reynolds was indicted for bigamy under the 
Morrill Act.
39
 The U.S. Attorney explained the deal to the grand jury. He 
later wrote the Attorney General: 
 
 
 35. See DAVIS BITTON, GEORGE Q. CANNON: A BIOGRAPHY 169–96 (1999) (detailing Cannon‘s 
political activities in the early 1870s). 
 36. Letter from J.S. Wiekizer to A.J. Ackerman, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Oct. 9, 1871) (on file with 
the National Archives, College Park, Maryland). 
 37. ORSON F. WHITNEY, 3 HISTORY OF UTAH 46–47 (1893). According to Whitney, a partisan 
Mormon, the terms of the deal were as follows: ―It was stipulated that the defendant in the case should 
produce the evidence for his own indictment and conviction, and it was generally understood that the 
infliction of punishment in this instance would be waived. Only the first half of the arrangement was 
realized.‖ Id. However, Robert N. Baskin, who consulted with the U.S. Attorney in the case, denied 
that any such deal was struck. See ROBERT N. BASKIN, REMINISCENCES OF EARLY UTAH 61–62 
(1914). Baskin‘s blanket denial cannot be correct in light of the overwhelming contemporary evidence 
that Reynolds was a preselected and (initially, at least) willing defendant. See BITTON, supra note 35, 
at 218–24 (discussing Cannon‘s conversation with Reynolds and the initial stages of the litigation); 
BRUCE A. VAN ORDEN, PRISONER FOR CONSCIENCE‘ SAKE: THE LIFE OF GEORGE REYNOLDS 61–62 
(1992) (same). One likely explanation, in light of the rapid break down of relations, is that an 
agreement was made but that its precise terms were left vague. Cannon and the other Mormon leaders 
do not seem to have had any legal counsel in their negotiations with the U.S. Attorney. Very likely, the 
Mormons did not play out the ―end game‖ with sufficient detail ahead of time to nail down specifics 
with the federal officials. As the full implications of the deal became apparent, they understood the 
ambiguity in the terms outlined by Whitney, namely, that Reynolds would not be punished if he was 
found guilty. This theory is also consistent with Whitney‘s equivocal language—―it was generally 
understood that‖—about the precise contours of the deal. See WHITNEY, supra, at 47. However, there 
is at least some semicontemporaneous evidence to suggest that, as part of the deal, federal officials 
affirmatively agreed that Reynolds would not be punished. In 1878, while Reynolds‘s case was 
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, James Horrocks, one of the members of the grand jury that 
indicted Reynolds, told a journalist that there was an agreement not to inflict punishment. HISTORY OF 
THE BENCH AND BAR OF UTAH 48 (C.C. Goodwin ed., 1913). According to the journalist: ―‗He said 
without equivocation that the jurors were instructed, or at least advised, that there was no disposition 
to inflict punishment, but merely a design on the part of the Government‘s representatives to make 
sure of their ground before going further.‘‖ Id. (quoting journalist S.A. Kenner). James Horrocks was a 
Mormon who was born in England in 1835 and immigrated to Utah with his father and mother. See 
Mormon family history records (on file with author), available at http://www.new. familysearch.org 
(last visited Jan. 3. 2011). 
 38. See VAN ORDEN, supra note 37, at 61–62. 
 39. Id. at 62. 
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I told them my plan of operations, that crime must be punished &c 
and that there were questions here that had divided the people and 
caused bitter animosities for many years: that the sooner these 
questions were settled the better, and that I purposed to make some 
test cases and let the highest tribunal of the country settle them, if 
all parties felt disposed so to do.
40
 
Reynolds was found guilty, and, after an initially successful appeal to the 
Territorial Supreme Court and a retrial,
41
 he ultimately appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, where his case was argued in November 1878.
42
 
B. The Natural Law Argument in Reynolds 
Reynolds‘s lawyers defended polygamy by situating the Free Exercise 
Clause within the natural law tradition. The bare bones of their position 
can be seen in the U.S. Reports‘ summary of the arguments presented 
before the Court. According to that truncated report, they argued that: 
The offence prohibited by [the anti-polygamy laws] is not malum in 
se; it is not prohibited by the decalogue [i.e. the ten 
commandments]; and, if it be said that its prohibition is to be found 
in the teachings of the New Testament, we know that a majority of 
the people of [the Territory of Utah] deny that the Christian law 
contains any such prohibition.
43
 
By invoking the distinction between actions that are mala in se and mala 
prohibita, Reynolds‘s lawyers built on a theory that saw certain actions as 
inherently subject to prohibition. Furthermore, by turning to the Bible and 
the opinions of the majority of the people, they were adopting two forms 
of argument with deep roots in Blackstone, Grotius, and the natural law 
tradition. 
 
 
 40. Letter from William Carey, U.S. Dist. Attorney, to George H. Williams, U.S. Attorney Gen. 
(Dec. 29, 1874) (on file with the National Archives, College Park, Maryland). 
 41. See generally United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 226 (1875) (Reynolds‘s first, successful 
appeal to the Territorial Supreme Court); United States v. Reynolds, 1 Utah 319 (1876) (Reynolds‘s 
second, unsuccessful appeal to the Territorial Supreme Court). The Territorial Supreme Court 
dismissed Reynolds‘s First Amendment claim without argument: ―The Appellant assigns as error the 
rejection of evidence offered by him to show that plural or polygamous marriage was part of his 
religion. This objection of the Appellant, is, as we conceive, based upon neither reason, justice nor 
law, and therefore we dismiss it without further notice.‖ Reynolds, 1 Utah 226, at 227.  
 42. See The Utah Polygamy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1878, at 2 (describing oral argument in 
the case). 
 43. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 152–53 (1878). 
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A key source for understanding the natural law theory presented to the 
Court in Reynolds is A Review of the Decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in the Case of George Reynolds vs. the United States, a 
short book responding to the decision that was penned by George Q. 
Cannon, the moving force behind the Mormon legal strategy, shortly after 
the opinion came down.
44
 Cannon had no legal training, and Reynolds‘s 
lawyers—George Biddle, a former Attorney General in the Buchanan 
administration, and Benjamin Sheeks, local trial counsel in the case—
almost certainly assisted in preparing the pamphlet.
45
 In their brief to the 
Court, Reynolds‘s lawyers focused overwhelmingly on technical 
objections unrelated to his First Amendment claim.
46
 At oral argument, 
however, the Justices were more interested in the Free Exercise Clause.
47
 
Biddle, who argued the case, was clearly prepared with a theory of the 
amendment, but because there is no transcript of the oral argument, we 
must piece the argument together from a variety of sources. The arguments 
in Cannon‘s Review enlarge on the truncated descriptions of the oral 
arguments that have survived, and it likely reflects in detail the theory 
offered to the Court by Biddle.  
The problem of creating a workable regime of religious freedom is 
ultimately one of baselines. If any religiously motivated action forbidden 
by the law is ipso facto unprotected because it is a ―crime,‖ then there are 
no meaningful restrictions on the state‘s ability to criminalize religious 
practices. Such prohibitions will tautologically justify themselves. On the 
other hand, if any religious claim can vitiate the requirements of any 
criminal statute, then the law would be fully exposed to the anarchic 
claims of religious conscience. In order to create a workable system of 
 
 
 44. See BITTON, supra note 35, at 226. Cannon‘s Review is, in many ways, a remarkable 
document. Coming out as it did between the time of the Reynolds decision and the Court‘s disposition 
of the petition for rehearing, Cannon prepared it in a relatively short period—no more than a few 
months—during which time he was busy with other duties. Nevertheless, it evidences a great deal of 
research and careful thought. Cannon‘s sources range from Blackstone (three separate American 
editions were consulted) to Justinian and St. Ambrose. In short, of the contemporary Mormon writings 
on the Reynolds decision, Cannon‘s Review is far and away the most legally and philosophically 
sophisticated. See generally GEORGE Q. CANNON, A REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CASE OF GEORGE REYNOLDS VS. THE UNITED STATES (1879). 
 45. See GORDON, supra note 4, at 123 (discussing George Biddle‘s political and professional 
background and his retention in the Reynolds case); VAN ORDEN, supra note 37, at 85 (discussing 
Benjamin Sheeks‘s role in Reynolds‘s appeals). 
 46. See generally Brief of the Plaintiff in Error, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1978) 
(No. 108) [hereinafter Reynolds Brief] (focusing on the admissibility of transcripts of prior oral 
testimony in lieu of live testimony by absent witnesses and the proper number of grand jurors under 
federal statutes governing the territorial judiciary). 
 47. The Utah Polygamy Case, supra note 42 (describing oral argument in the case). 
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religious freedom, we need some baseline of acceptable regulation from 
which deviations—while perhaps normally tolerable—will not be 
permitted in the case of religious objections. The Court in Reynolds 
ultimately resolved the issue by finding a baseline in the definition of 
religion. ―Congress cannot pass a law . . . which shall prohibit the free 
exercise of religion,‖48 it argued, but religiously inspired conduct (as 
opposed to religious belief) did not count as ―religion‖ within the meaning 
of the First Amendment.
49
 Such a regime provided a coherent and 
workable solution to the baseline problem of religious liberty by 
separating protected ―religion‖ (belief) from unprotected ―religion‖ 
(action).  
Reynolds‘s lawyers resolved the baseline issue by, in effect, giving a 
natural-law gloss to the Free Exercise Clause‘s use of the word ―law.‖ The 
natural law tradition on which they drew did not deny that the legal 
enactments of human governments are always law in some sense.
50
 What 
it affirmed was that some laws are qualitatively different than others 
because they conform to the eternal law of nature. Blackstone gave a crude 
and absolutist version of this position when he wrote, ―no human laws are 
of any validity, if contrary to [natural law]; and such of them as are valid 
derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, 
from this original.‖51 Biddle and Sheeks, however, did not take this 
extreme position. Rather, by invoking the distinction between actions that 
are mala in se and those that are merely mala prohibita, they played on the 
discontinuous character of law in the natural law perspective. Even if one 
did not believe that natural law exempted one from positive law by its own 
force, some laws were still more truly ―law‖ than others.52 Cannon and the 
lawyers who advised Reynolds did not maintain any illusions that—as the 
Supreme Court caricatured their argument—―the professed doctrines of 
 
 
 48. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162. 
 49. Id. at 164 (―‗[T]he legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions. 
. . .‘‖ (quoting Thomas Jefferson)). 
 50. Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 223, 226 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
 51. Id. It is important to note that Blackstone did not believe that natural law justified judicial 
review and invalidation of legislation. 
Contrary to the perceptions of modern critics . . . Blackstone did not believe that judges or 
legislators could use the principles of natural law to derive appropriate answers to all or even 
most legal questions. . . . As Blackstone observed, God was not concerned with whether 
English law forbade or permitted the export of wool.  
Albert Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1996). 
 52. See Bix, supra note 50, at 226 (discussing Aquinas‘s claim that an unjust law is not truly a 
law at all). 
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religious belief [should be] superior to the law of the land, and every 
citizen [should be permitted] to become a law unto himself.‖53 Rather, they 
offered a carefully worked-out limiting principle to their claim, implicitly 
appealing to natural law for a baseline that could arbitrate the claims of 
both church and state.
54
 
According to Reynolds‘s brief, the Bill of Rights limited congressional 
authority over the territories.
55
 Although it did not explicitly cite the First 
Amendment, it in effect argued that Congress could not forbid religious 
behavior that was not malum in se. Thus, the key question was whether 
polygamy was malum in se. The brief argued: 
Bigamy is not prohibited by the general moral code. There is no 
command against it in the decalogue. Its prohibition may, perhaps, 
be said to be found in the teachings of the New Testament. Granted, 
for the purpose of the argument. But a majority of the inhabitants 
might be persons not recognizing the binding force of this 
dispensation. In point of fact, we know that a majority of the people 
of this particular Territory deny that the Christian law makes any 
such prohibition. We are therefore led to the assertion that as to the 
people of this Territory the supposed offence is a creature of 
positive enactment.
56
 
In oral argument, Biddle hammered away at this point, claiming that 
polygamy ―is an artificial crime, created by legislative enactment, and 
involving, when practiced as a religious duty, no moral guilt.‖57 In his 
Review, Cannon amplified on the argument. Polygamy, he claimed, as a 
crime was merely malum prohibitum.
58
 Unlike crimes that are mala in se, 
which he argued ―cannot be committed under the name of religion without 
exposing the perpetrator to the just punishment of the laws,‖ a crime that 
 
 
 53. Id. at 167. 
 54. It was a move with antecedents in earlier American legal thought. For example, a review in 
an 1830 American law journal asked rhetorically, ―How else than by principles of the natural law, are 
we to discuss the questions of religious toleration [and] the obligation of mere positive laws, with the 
distinction between mala prohibita and malum in se . . .?‖ Jus Naturae et Gentium, A Review, 1830 N. 
AM. REV. 135, reprinted in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 490 (Charles M. Haar ed., 1965). 
 55. Reynolds Brief, supra note 46, at 53–55. Interestingly, the only provision of the Bill of 
Rights that Reynolds did explicitly cite in this part of his argument was the Second Amendment. See 
id. at 53. 
 56. Id. at 54–55. 
 57. The Utah Polygamy Case, supra note 42 (quoting Biddle in oral argument). 
 58. See CANNON, supra note 44, at 33 (referring to polygamy as a crime created entirely by 
statute). 
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―depends entirely for its existence upon statute‖ is different when the 
underlying activity is motivated by religion.
59
 
When it is a religious belief and ordinance, and men and women 
believe their future salvation and happiness are intimately 
interwoven with and dependent upon its correct and virtuous 
observance, it is beyond the reach of the legislative arm . . . . The 
first amendment of the Constitution protects it.
60
 
The concept of malum in se was linked—as the brief‘s reference to ―the 
general moral code‖ suggests61—to natural law. Blackstone provides a 
useful elaboration on the distinction used by Reynolds‘s lawyers. He 
spoke of ―crimes that are malum in se [sic] and prohibited by the law of 
nature, such as murder and the like.‖62 He also distinguished acts that are 
mala in se (contrary to natural law) from those that were mala prohibita. 
He wrote that ―things in themselves indifferent become either right or 
wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemeanors according as the municipal 
legislator sees proper for promoting the welfare of the society and more 
effectually carrying on the purposes of civil life.‖63 The distinction thus 
drew the line between rules rooted in the law of nature and those that 
resulted from decisions of mere convenience or expedience by lawmakers. 
By invoking the Bible and the opinions of the people of the territory, 
Cannon and the brief were making two independent arguments about how 
one discovers natural law. First, natural law was thought to coincide with 
divine law. Quoting Grotius, Cannon argued that ―[w]hen God permits a 
thing in certain cases, and to certain persons, or in regard to certain 
nations, it may be inferred, that the thing is not evil in its own nature.‖64 
Although Grotius argued that natural law would be valid ―even if we 
should concede that which cannot be conceded without the utmost 
wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no 
concern to him,‖ he insisted that ―the law of nature . . . can nevertheless 
 
 
 59. CANNON, supra note 44, at 33. 
 60. Id. at 33–34. 
 61. Reynolds Brief, supra note 46, at 54. 
 62. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *29. Blackstone was speaking here of the rule of 
criminal law that a woman who committed a crime in the presence of her husband was presumed to 
have acted under coercion, except in the cases that were mala in se. See id. The rule was followed in 
the United States at the time of the Reynolds decision. See, e.g., Hensly v. State, 52 Ala. 10 (1875); 
State v. Williams, 65 N.C. 398 (1871). 
 63. Alschuler, supra note 51, at 25 (internal citations omitted). 
 64. CANNON, supra note 44, at 37 (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 
bk. I, ch. 2, § 17 (1625)). 
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rightly be attributed to God.‖65 The link between divine and natural law 
also emerges in Blackstone, who argued that the fallen state of man‘s 
reason 
has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of divine 
providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection, 
and the blindness of human reason, hath been pleased, at sundry 
times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce its laws by an 
immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we 
call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the 
holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon 
comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they 
tend in all their consequences to man‘s felicity.66 
The claim put forward by Grotius and Blackstone was not that the Bible 
could be applied as a source of law in and of itself. Rather, it was that the 
revealed word of God provided evidence as to the content of natural law, 
although there were other admitted sources of evidence for such law. 
Following this tradition, nineteenth-century American courts routinely 
referred to the Decalogue as a standard for discovering natural law.
67
 
These judges did not claim that the Ten Commandments were legally 
binding in themselves. Rather, they used the Ten Commandments as one 
of several baselines from which natural law might be deduced.
68
 In 
pointing to the absence of a prohibition against polygamy in the scriptures, 
Reynolds‘s defenders were explicitly invoking this conventional legal 
argument. Because polygamy was not forbidden by revelation in the Bible, 
they argued with Grotius that ―it cannot be inferred that the thing 
[polygamy] is evil in itself, according to the law of nature.‖69 
The second line of reasoning implicitly invoked by Cannon and the 
brief is what was called the consensus gentium. According to this 
argument, things such as murder, which are universally forbidden by all 
 
 
 65. See HUGO GROTIUS, PROLEGOMENA TO THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 10–11 (Francis W. 
Kelsey trans., 1957) (1625). 
 66. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *41–42. 
 67. See, e.g., Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211, 215 (1855) (―‗Honor thy father and mother‘ is a 
command not only of the decalogue, but of nature . . . .‖); Caldwell v. Hennen, 5 Rob. 20, 26 (La. 
1843) (same); State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 284 (1835) (referring to ―the law of God and nature 
contained in the decalogue‖). 
 68. See, e.g., Foreman, 16 Tenn. at 284 (referring to ―the law of God and nature contained in the 
decalogue‖). 
 69. CANNON, supra note 44, at 37 (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 
bk. II, ch. 5, § 9 (1625)). 
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legal systems, violate natural law.
70
 On the other hand, things that are not 
universally forbidden, such as polygamy, do not violate natural law.
71
 The 
appeal to comparative law had deep roots in natural law theorizing. 
Grotius regularly cited ―scores of examples and arguments taken from the 
writings of ancient philosophers, historians, poets, rhetoricians, and 
theologians, as well as from the Bible.‖72 Such examples constituted proof 
of a principle of natural law. ―[W]hen so many learned and wise men, who 
also happen to represent different nations . . . affirm the same principles as 
being true or certain,‖ he in effect argued, ―it must be due to the operation 
of a ‗universal cause.‘‖73 
The concept of consensus gentium also found its way into Blackstone, 
although he did not use the term. Rather, he constantly invoked historical 
and comparative analogies to defend and justify English law. For example, 
Blackstone described the way that English judicial power flowed from the 
king as the highest judge into a myriad of lower courts.
74
 He then 
explicitly linked this process of delegation of authority with natural law, 
citing the laws of different nations as a justification. Such an arrangement, 
he said, is: 
An institution that seems highly agreeable to the dictates of natural 
reason, as well as of more enlightened policy; being equally familiar 
to that which prevailed in Mexico and Peru before they were 
discovered by the Spaniards; and that which was established in the 
Jewish republic of Moses.
75
 
Agreement across cultures and times—including Biblical history—
suggested ―the dictates of natural reason.‖ This mode of comparative 
argument is ubiquitous in the Commentaries. For example, on the subject 
of testamentary succession, he argued that ―the universal law of almost 
every nation (which is a kind of secondary law of nature) has . . . given the 
dying person a power of continuing his property, by disposing of his 
possessions by will.‖76 Note the link between ―the universal law of almost 
every nation‖ and the ―law of nature.‖ 
 
 
 70. See Richard H. Cox, Hugo Grotius, in A HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 386, 389 (Leo 
Strauss et al. eds., 3d ed. 1987) (discussing Grotius‘s use of the consensus gentium). 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *30–31. 
 75. Id. at *31. 
 76. Id. at *10. For additional examples of this kind of argument in Blackstone, see id. at *311 
(―In all well-governed nations some notoriety of this kind [investiture] has been ever held requisite 
. . . .‖); 3 id. at *350 (explaining that the jury trial ―was ever esteemed, in all countries, a privilege of 
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To be sure, it is easy to overstate the respect accorded to non-Western 
legal systems by natural law writers. These authors generally appealed to 
the consensus gentium as a way of bolstering the claim that their own legal 
systems corresponded to natural law. Blackstone‘s appeals to non-Western 
legal systems, for example, always take the form of an apologetic for the 
common law, showing its conformity with universal reason.
77
 He never 
uses the conflict between common law rules and non-Western legal 
practices as evidence that English law did not emanate from the law of 
nature. Indeed, the usual absence of any critical bite to the consensus 
gentium might lead to the conclusion that, in practice, it was more of a 
consensus occidorum with a few exotic examples thrown in as rhetorical 
window dressing. It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss the argument 
as entirely ephemeral. For example, Hugo Grotius, operating in the firmly 
monogamous context of early-seventeenth-century Holland, nevertheless 
concluded that the natural law permitted polygamy, in part on the basis of 
the laws of the ancient Hebrews.
78
 
 
 
the highest and most beneficial nature‖); id. at *384 (―All over the world, actions transitory follow the 
person of the defendant, territorial suits must be discussed in the territorial tribunal.‖); 4 id. at *3 
(―[T]he criminal law is in every country of Europe more rude and imperfect than the civil.‖); id. at 
*104 (explaining that those objecting to the Church of England were ―encroaching on those rights 
which reason and the original contract of every free state in the universe have vested in the sovereign 
power‖); id. at *181 (stating, ―through our own, and all other laws‖ there is ―the one uniform principle 
. . . that where a crime, in itself capital, is endeavored to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel 
that force by the death of the party attempting‖); id. at *194 (―[W]illful murder; a crime at which 
human nature starts, and which is I believe punished almost universally throughout the world with 
death.‖). 
 77. Daniel Boorstin summed up the approach, writing that for Blackstone: 
From the uniformity of man‘s nature and the constancy of God‘s purposes arises the 
uniformity of the laws of nature which makes relevant all information about the past of 
English law and the analogous institutions of ancient Rome and the distant kingdom of 
Widdah. It would be impossible to conceive of a country or an epoch whose experience could 
not illuminate these eternal, universal laws. 
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE‘S 
COMMENTARIES 47 (1996). 
 78. See HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE bk. I, ch. 2, § 6.2, at *31 (―And those, 
who are of that Opinion, are strangely embarrassed to prove, that certain Things which are forbid by 
the Gospel, as Concubinage, Divorce, Polygamy, are likewise condemned by the Law of Nature. 
Indeed these are such that Reason itself informs us it is more Decent to refrain from them, but yet not 
such, as (without the Divine Law) would be criminal. The Christian Religion commands, that we 
should lay down our Lives one for another; but who will pretend to say, that we are obliged to this by 
the Law of Nature. Justin Martyr says, To live only according to the Law of Nature, is to live like an 
Infidel.‖). Grotius‘s argument over polygamy, however, is also thoroughly embedded in debates over 
the relationship between divine law and natural law. He uses the example of polygamy mainly to drive 
a wedge between the notion that the commands of natural law are identical with the commands of the 
Christian Gospel. Hence, his argument has as much to do with Biblical interpretation as with the 
consensus gentium. See generally id. at *32–35. 
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Seen in this light, the Mormon reference to the Decalogue fits into a 
familiar pattern of comparative argument. The absence of a prohibition on 
polygamy in ancient Israel, in the New Testament, or among the Mormons 
themselves suggested that—unlike murder—there is no universal 
consensus against polygamy. In support of this claim, Cannon marshaled 
not only the support of the Bible and Mormon legal experience, but also 
early Church Fathers and non-Western legal systems.
79
 For example, he 
acknowledged that traditional bigamy, in which a husband abandoned his 
wife and remarried a second woman without informing her of the previous 
marriage, ―is a wrong of the most grave and damning character.‖80 The 
universal condemnation of this crime, however, did not extend, he argued, 
to ―the patriarchal marriage of the Latter-day Saints, or even the marriages 
of Mohammedans and other Asiatics,‖ because in such cases there is no 
deception or abandonment.
81
 If this sort of polygamy was malum in se, 
Reynolds‘s defenders in effect argued, there should be a universal 
consensus against it. The absence of such a consensus suggested that it 
was merely malum prohibitum and therefore protected by the First 
Amendment when done as a religious ordinance.
82
 
The natural law authorities and the style of argument used by Biddle 
before the Court in 1878 was a common part of American legal discourse 
in the first half of the nineteenth century.
83
 For most of the nineteenth 
century, apprenticeship and an informal program of ―reading law‖ in an 
established attorney‘s office was the dominant model of legal education.84 
Of the books available to nineteenth-century American lawyers, 
Blackstone was by far the most widely read.
85
 However, the classic natural 
law treatises of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—Grotius, 
Pufendorf, and Vattel—remained an important part of the standard law 
books that an aspiring lawyer might study.
86
 In addition, writers such as 
 
 
 79. See CANNON, supra note 44, at 37–38. 
 80. Id. at 31. 
 81. See id. at 29. 
 82. See id. at 34. 
 83. See Hugh C. MacGill & R. Kent Newmyer, Legal Education and Legal Thought, 1790–1920, 
in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: VOLUME II, THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 
(1790–1920) 41 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (―Among the synthetic works 
consulted by American students during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were . . . 
Rutherford‘s Institutes of Natural Law (1754–56).‖). 
 84. See id. at 36 (discussing legal education in the nineteenth century). 
 85. Id. at 40 (―[U]ntil the 1870s, Blackstone‘s Commentaries did more to shape American legal 
education and thought than any other single work.‖). 
 86. Id. at 41 (stating that the works of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel were among the most 
widely used continental works ―frequently consulted for specific doctrines and for general ideas about 
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James Kent and St. George Tucker produced treatises on American law 
with a natural law bent that became standard works for several 
generations.
87
 For example, Kent opens his 1826 Commentaries on 
American Law with a discussion of the relationship between natural law 
and the law of nations, insisting that  
it would be improper to separate this law entirely from natural 
jurisprudence, and not to consider it as deriving much of its force, 
and dignity, and sanction, from the same principles of right reason, 
and the same view of the nature and constitution of man, from 
which the science of morality is deduced.
88
 
He likewise identifies the foundations of the common law with ―the 
application of the dictates of natural justice, and of cultivated reason, to 
particular cases.‖89 Perhaps more importantly, throughout the nineteenth 
century, the American courts regularly referred to ―natural law‖ or 
―natural justice‖ either as a source of law or else, more frequently, as a 
justification for a particular rule or interpretation.
90
 
By the time Biddle invoked this style of argument in November 1878, 
however, newer narratives of race, progress, and imperialism were 
replacing the earlier ideal of natural reason based on a universal human 
nature.
91
 It was to these narratives that the Court turned in rejecting the 
arguments put forward by the Mormons‘ lawyers.  
 
 
law‖); see also ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 23–26 (1938) (discussing 
the use of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel as early American legal textbooks). 
 87. See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 62; JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW (1826); ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE‘S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (1803). 
 88. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 2 (1826). 
 89. Id. at 439. 
 90. See, e.g., Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876) (describing the right to defense of 
person and property as ―a principle of natural justice‖); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512 (1873) 
(describing an attorney‘s right to receive notice of the grounds for disbarment and an ample 
opportunity for defense as ―a rule of natural justice‖); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 221 (1827) 
(describing retroactive laws as ―contrary to the first principles of natural justice‖); Vowles v. Craig, 12 
U.S. (8 Cranch) 371, 376 (1814) (appealing to the writers of ―natural law‖ as a source of law). 
 91. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE WORLD OF NATIONS: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN HISTORY, 
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 73 (1973) (discussing the shift in intellectual emphasis from human nature 
and natural law to race and civilization). 
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II. IMPERIALISM AND THE REJECTION OF NATURAL LAW IN REYNOLDS  
The Court‘s opinion was silent with respect to Reynolds‘s natural law 
arguments. It implicitly responded to them, however, by noting that 
―[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and western 
nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, 
was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African 
people.‖92 In contrast to the argument from a consensus gentium, however, 
with its essentially positive attitude toward non-Western legal systems, in 
the Court‘s reasoning this comparative link became a damning indictment 
of the Mormon legal claim. The reasons for this shift lie at least in part in 
the different jurisprudential universe in which the Court‘s opinion moves, 
a universe animated by Victorian ideas of civilization, barbarism, and 
progress, rather than seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ideas of natural 
reason. 
If the discussion of religious freedom in the brief for Reynolds was 
truncated, the discussion of the same issue in the brief for the United 
States was virtually nonexistent. The Attorney General‘s only reference to 
the issue of whether ―the circumstance that polygamy was a matter of 
religion with the church to which the defendant belonged, was a 
defense‖93 was a curt dismissal. ―None of these last mentioned 
exceptions,‖ he wrote, ―call for any remark.‖94 Nevertheless, in oral 
argument, the government did deal with the issue of religious freedom by 
presenting a parade of horribles that would ensue if the Mormon position 
was adopted. The Attorney General argued that ―under this rigid 
interpretation of the Constitution, a sect of East Indian Thugs who should 
settle in the Territories might commit murder with impunity, on the 
ground that it was sanctioned and enjoined by their system of religious 
belief.‖95 He amplified on the Indian parallel, citing ―the burning of 
widows in India as [a crime] committed in the name of religion, to which 
he compared plural marriage.‖96 By invoking examples from India, the 
government implicitly responded to the natural law arguments of the 
 
 
 92. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 93. Brief for the United States at 8, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (No. 180). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Is Polygamy a Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1878, at 4. 
 96. See CANNON, supra note 44, at 34. In his Review, Cannon gives vent to his exasperation with 
this exceedingly common comparison, writing: ―Respect for his position as Attorney-General of the 
United States, prevents me from characterizing this argument as it deserves.‖ Id. at 34–35. He also 
notes the surprise ―that lawyers and men of sense would use it.‖ Id. at 35. 
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Mormons by inviting the Court to equate federal suppression of polygamy 
with the British Raj‘s suppression of similar barbarisms in India. 
The Court accepted this invitation, writing that ―[l]aws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices.‖97 It went on to ask 
rhetorically, ―if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself 
upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power 
of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?‖98 
The Court‘s reference was more than simply an unflattering comparison of 
Mormon polygamy to the Hindu practice of ―suttee.‖ It was a 
jurisprudential reference with a long history in the anti-polygamy battles. 
At the heart of this reference was a two-step move. First, the Mormons 
were conceptualized as a foreign race akin to the inhabitants of the Indian 
subcontinent, and second, the federal rule in territorial Utah was likened to 
the British Raj in India, bringing civilization through law to the benighted 
masses over whom it ruled. 
After the Mormon exodus to the Great Basin, Americans came to see 
Mormons—the majority of whom were either displaced Yankees or 
converts from Northern Europe—as a foreign race. For example, in 1858, 
Roberts Bartholow, an assistant surgeon attached to the U.S. Army, wrote 
a report for the War Department on conditions in Utah. After discussing 
the exotic flora and fauna of the remote territory, he wrote, ―The Mormon, 
of all human animals now walking this globe, is the most curious in every 
relation.‖99 According to Bartholow, the practice of polygamy had given 
rise to a physiologically distinct race. 
Isolated in the narrow valleys of Utah, and practising the rites of a 
religion grossly material, of which polygamy is the main element 
and cohesive force, the Mormon people have arrived at a physical 
and mental condition, in a few years of growth, such as densely-
populated communities in the older parts of the world, hereditary 
victims of all the vices of civilization, have been ages in reaching. 
This condition is shown by the preponderance of female births, by 
the mortality in infantine life, by the large proportion of the 
albuminous and gelatinous types of constitution, and by the striking 
 
 
 97. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
 98. Id. 
 99. U.S. WAR DEP‘T, STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SICKNESS AND MORTALITY IN THE ARMY OF 
THE UNITED STATES, S. EXEC. DOC. No. 36-52, at 301 (1860) (containing information compiled from 
a period of five years, from January 1855 to January 1860). 
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uniformity in facial expression and in physical conformation of the 
younger portion of the community.
100
 
The rise of this new race resulted, according to Bartholow, from two 
causes. First, he claimed that the insatiable lust of Mormon patriarchs 
interfered with the ordinary sexual development of girls, resulting in racial 
degradation.
101
 ―To sustain the system,‖ he wrote, ―girls are ‗sealed‘ at the 
earliest manifestations of puberty, and I am credibly informed, that means 
are not unfrequently made use of to hasten the period.‖102 This interference 
with the proper course of nature resulted in an anemic offspring. In 
particular, he noted that ―[o]ne of the most deplorable effects of polygamy 
is shown in the genital weakness of the boys and young men, the progeny 
of the ‗peculiar institution.‘‖103 This ―sexual debility‖ was compounded by 
the fact that, among the Mormons, ―[t]he sexual desires are stimulated to 
an unnatural degree at a very early age, and as female virtue is easy, 
opportunities are not wanting for their gratification.‖104  
The accuracy of Bartholow‘s claims regarding Mormon sexual habits, 
organs, and general anatomy is doubtful. He was an army surgeon in a 
camp located some distance from any of the major Mormon settlements.
105
 
His report, however, is a striking example of how the nineteenth-century 
American imagination racialized Mormons using Asian stereotypes. The 
image of the indolent Oriental, descended from an anemic racial stock and 
made effete by sexual excess was a standard trope in contemporary 
treatments of Asians ranging from Turks to Chinese.
106
 Likewise, 
according to Bartholow: 
[The Mormon expression is] compounded of sensuality, cunning, 
suspicion, and a smirking self-conceit. The yellow, sunken, 
cadaverous visage; the greenish-colored eyes; the thick, protuberant 
lips; the low forehead; the light, yellowish hair; and the lank, 
angular person, constitute an appearance so characteristic of the 
 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 302. 
 105. See Eugene E. Campbell, Governmental Beginnings, in UTAH‘S HISTORY 153, 170 (Richard 
D. Poll, Thomas G. Alexander, Eugene E. Campbell & David E. Miller eds., 1978) (―The army moved 
quietly through abandoned and silent Great Salt Lake City on June 26 and soon established itself forty 
miles to the southwest in Cedar Valley; the post was named Camp Floyd.‖). 
 106. See, e.g., JOHN MCLEOD, BEGINNING POSTCOLONIALISM 46 (2000) (―Compositely, Oriental 
stereotypes fixed typical weaknesses as (amongst others) cowardliness, laziness, untrustworthiness, 
fickleness, laxity, violence, and lust.‖). 
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new race, the production of polygamy, as to distinguish them at a 
glance.
107
 
Tellingly, however, it was precisely its proximity to Christian civilization 
that made the degradation of the new Mormon race especially acute: 
In eastern life, where [polygamy] has been a recognized domestic 
institution for ages, women are prepared for its continuance, and do 
not feel degraded by their association with it. The women of this 
Territory, how fanatical and ignorant soever, recognize their wide 
departure from the normal standard in all Christian countries; and 
from the degradation of the mother follows that of the child, and 
physical degeneracy is not a remote consequence of moral 
depravity.
108
 
While to modern racial sensibilities, it may seem odd that a group as 
Yankee and European as nineteenth-century Mormons should be 
considered a race distinct from white Americans, at the time it was 
common for ethnic groups we now think of as prototypically white to be 
classified as nonwhite. Noel Ignatiev, for example, has shown how the 
Irish were classified by nineteenth-century Anglo-Americans as 
nonwhite.
109
 Rather, they were members of the separate Celtic race, with 
its own characteristic propensities toward drunkenness, crime, indolence, 
and stupidity.
110
 The logic of Mormon racial identity, however, was 
slightly different. According to the standard racial logic, behavior resulted 
from racial identity.
111
 Orientals were indolent and sensual because 
indolence and sensuality were the natural condition of the Oriental race.
112
 
For Mormons, however, the logic moved in the opposite direction. A new 
race arose precisely because of the unnatural behaviors of the Latter-day 
Saints. For example, Bartholow‘s description of the new race in Utah 
 
 
 107. U.S. WAR DEP‘T, supra note 99, at 302. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See generally NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995). 
 110. See, e.g., THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICAN HISTORY 96 
(Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 1997) (1963) (―The elements of Celtic character are ‗furious fanaticism: a 
love of war and disorder; a hatred of order and patient industry; no accumulative habits; restless, 
treacherous, uncertain: look at Ireland.‖ (quoting a nineteenth-century racial theorist)). 
 111. See id. at 144 (―Races were thought to represent different stages of the evolutionary scale 
with the white race—or sometimes a subdivision of the white race—at the top. Accordingly, any given 
society represented the power and influce of its various racial stocks and the amount and quality of the 
intermixture among them. Heredity was considered immensely more important than enviroment in 
condition the development of society, and to many of the social theorists heredity meant mainly 
race.‖). 
 112. See, e.g., MCLEOD, supra note 106, at 46. 
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became the subject of debate before the New Orleans Academy of Science 
in 1860.
113
 According to one member of the Academy, ―the whole of 
Mohammedan polygamy‖ differs from Mormonism because ―[i]t is not a 
violation of natural law, where the natural instincts of the normal 
condition of the race do not forbid it.‖114 In contrast, for a white man, 
polygamy is ―contrary to his nature and his instincts.‖115 The unnatural 
polygamy of the Mormons thus led to degradation similar to 
miscegenation, another supposedly unnatural practice. ―[T]he Mormon 
type, is . . . the violation of natural law, which all men read in the 
instinctive aversion of different races, [and] degrades the offspring and 
commences the process of a certain extinction.‖116 Thus, the Mormon 
racial identity, rather than arising from ―natural or second causes,‖117 was 
defined by what Martha Ertman has aptly described as ―race treason.‖118 
Whatever the complexities of racial theorizing, however, in the popular 
imagination, Mormons were associated with Asians and Africans.
119
 
While Bartholow thought of himself as a ―medical philosopher,‖120 the 
creation of a Mormon race had legal implications.
121
 Their status as a 
degenerate people justified imperial control, hence the common equation 
of federal rule in Utah with the British Empire in India. For example, the 
Court in Reynolds used virtually the same arguments that Grant‘s vice 
president, Schulyer Colfax, had advanced nine years earlier in a widely 
reported speech and newspaper article in the New York Independent.
122
 In 
 
 
 113. See C.G. Forshey, Hereditary Descent; or Depravity of the Offspring of Polygamy Among the 
Mormons, 30 DE BOW‘S REV. 206, 210 (1861). 
 114. Id. at 211. 
 115. Id. at 210. 
 116. Id. at 211. 
 117. Id. at 213. 
 118. See generally Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on 
Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287 (2010). 
 119. Ertman powerfully illustrates this popular perception through an analysis of Mormons in 
nineteenth-century political cartoons. Her research reveals that Mormon polygamists were routinely 
associated visually with blacks and Asians. The implication was that Mormons constituted a foreign 
agent of miscegenation within the American polity. See id. at 304–06 (discussing the presentation of 
Mormon polygamists in nineteenth-century cartoons); see also Nathan B. Oman, Preaching to the 
Court House and Judging in the Temple, 2009 BYU L. REV. 157, 213–14 (discussing the analogy 
made between Mormon ecclesiastical courts and private dispute resolution among Chinese 
immigrants). 
 120. Roberts Bartholow, Hereditary Descent; or Depravity of the Offspring of Polygamy Among 
the Mormons, 30 DEBOW‘S REV. 206, 208 (1861). 
 121. Cf. IAN F. HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) 
(showing how race was used as a justification for legal coercion and how legal coercion was used to 
define and police the boundaries of race in nineteenth-century America). 
 122. See generally Schulyer Colfax, The Mormon Question, N.Y. INDEP., reprinted in SARAH 
BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN 
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those materials, Colfax made the comparison between the federal 
government and the British Raj explicit. ―The Brahmins claimed,‖ he 
wrote, ―as the Mormons do now in regard to their institution, that it [i.e. 
―suttee‖] was taught in their sacred books, and conferred the highest merit 
on both husband and wife.‖123 He went on to laud the English imperial 
authorities for disregarding Indian objections to their efforts to suppress 
―suttee.‖ 
This, history tells us, created much excitement in Bengal, and, 
indeed, all over India, the Brahmins denouncing it with great 
violence (as the Mormons denounce our anti-polygamy law of 
1862) as an ―interference with their religion.‖ . . . But England 
disregarded their ―religious‖ arguments, and stood as one man, with 
the whole power of the kingdom . . . and wherever English power is 
recognized, there, this so-called religious rite is now sternly 
forbidden and prevented. England, with united voice, said ―Stop!‖ 
and India obeyed.
124
 
In the wake of Colfax‘s attacks on Mormon polygamy, the church-owned 
Deseret News immediately picked up on the allusion, writing that ―Mr. 
Colfax and his ilk . . . insist that the United States government should 
extirpate the marriage sacrament of the ‗Mormons,‘ as the British 
government abolished the religious widow-burning of the Hindoos.‖125 
Indeed, although it does not appear in the Court‘s discussion of the issue, 
during Reynolds‘s second trial, the judge in charging the jury also 
compared the suppression of polygamy to the suppression of ―suttee.‖126 
Not surprisingly, in the wake of Reynolds, Cannon wrote, ―For thirty years 
the people of Utah have been forced to think upon and argue this subject 
[i.e. ―suttee‖] in all its bearings.‖127 Thus, the Court‘s opinion drew on a 
well-worn rhetorical image that explicitly linked the suppression of 
polygamy to British legal policy in India.  
 
 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 11, 15 (1870); see also WILLARD H. SMITH, SCHUYLER COLFAX: 
THE CHANGING FORTUNES OF A POLITICAL IDOL 219–31 (1952) (discussing Colfax‘s newspaper 
debate with Taylor). 
 123. Colfax, supra note 122, at 15. 
 124. Id. 
 125. A.M.M., Suttee and Polygamy, DESERET NEWS (undated reprint, L. Tom Perry Special 
Collections, Brigham Young University) (on file with author). 
 126. See VAN ORDEN, supra note 37, at 78 (discussing the Mormon newspaper response to the 
judge‘s comments). 
 127. CANNON, supra note 44, at 35. 
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―Suttee‖ is the nineteenth-century Anglicization of the Sanskrit word 
sati, which refers to the ritual suicide of a Hindu widow.
128
 Victorian 
British were horrified by the practice.
129
 Lurid pamphlets sold in England 
described ―suttee‖ and called for its abolition.130 However, decisive legal 
action was slow in coming. During the eighteenth century, British legal 
influence in India was weak, extending only to disputes involving 
Englishmen in a few narrowly circumscribed port towns.
131
 As conquest 
and intrigue carried British authority into the interior of the subcontinent, 
they expanded their legal jurisdiction.
132
 Initially, however, the English 
adopted an essentially positive attitude toward indigenous law and made 
little attempt to use imperial law to impose their cultural norms on 
Indians.
133
 Rather, as much as possible, they left existing legal structures 
intact.
134
  
 
 
 128. Sati became a part of Hinduism in the fourth century and continued until the British 
occupation of India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See Marilyn J. Harran, Suicide, in 14 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 125, 128–29 (Mircea Eliade ed., 1984) [hereinafter 
ENCYCLOPEDIA]. Although widow burning took the form of sati only in medieval Hinduism, evidence 
suggests that the practice may have much, much more ancient roots in the pre-Hindu cult of the 
earliest Indo-European fire gods. See Ellison Banks Findly, Agni, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra, at 133, 
134. Ancient and medieval Hinduism had several forms of religious suicide. Harran, supra, at 128. 
Most of these were associated with the ideal of renouncing completely the desires of the world in order 
to commune with the absolute or brahman. See id.; Jan Gonda, Indian Religions, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
supra, at 168, 170. For such seekers, known as samsāra, suicide was an act of extreme piety that 
crowned a long process of intense religious preparation and purification. See Harran, supra, at 128. As 
such, it was forbidden to those of lesser spiritual attainment. See id. At least in theory, sati was entirely 
voluntary. It took two forms. In the first, called sahamarana, the widow ascended her husband‘s 
funeral pyre and burned to death with his body. Id. at 129. In the second, called anumarana, a widow 
who was not present at her husband‘s cremation would lie down and die either with his ashes or with 
one of his possessions. Id. at 129. Her death ―both achieved an honored status for herself and atoned 
for the sins and misdeeds of herself and her husband.‖ Id. at 125. Widows who immolated themselves 
were held in extremely high regard. See JANAKI NAIR, WOMEN AND LAW IN COLONIAL INDIA 55 
(2000). Whether a curse or a blessing, such a woman on the way to her pyre had special power. 
Harran, supra, at 129. Nevertheless, the practice remained quite rare during the time of the British 
occupation. ―By its very definition, sati could neither be common nor widespread since its very moral 
force was derived from it being heroic or exceptional.‖ NAIR, supra, at 55. In 1824, just a few years 
before the British banned the practice, only 0.2% of all widows committed sati. Id. 
 129. See NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER AND 
THE LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER 117–20 (2002) (briefly recounting the Victorian movement against 
sati). 
 130. See, e.g., JAMES PEGGS, INDIA‘S CRIES TO BRITISH HUMANITY (1832) (a pamphlet containing 
thoughts ―relative to the Suttee, infanticide, British connection with idolatry, ghaut murders, and 
slavery in India: to which is added humane hints for the melioration of the state of society in British 
India‖). 
 131. See 2 M. RAMA JOIS, LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA 103–18 (1984) 
(recounting early British administration in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta). 
 132. See id. at 245. 
 133. See id. at 31 (―[T]he whole of Hindu Law and Mohamedan Law concerning family and 
religious usages was fully respected by the Courts.‖); see also NIALL FERGUSON, EMPIRE: THE RISE 
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Strikingly, the vestiges of this more relaxed, eighteenth-century attitude 
toward imperial government in India also made a brief appearance in the 
anti-polygamy battles. In 1872, Representative James Blair, a Liberal 
Republican from Missouri, made a quixotic attempt to repeal the Morrill 
Act, thus legalizing polygamy in the territories.
135
 In India, he noted, the 
British Raj had taken a tolerant attitude toward polygamy, with English 
missionaries in India going so far as to argue that polygamy did not 
contravene divine law.
136
 ―Shall England be more regardful of the 
obligations imposed upon her by the law of nations and public policy than 
the United States,‖ he asked rhetorically, ―or shall England be more 
generous and indulgent to her polygamous citizens in India than the 
United States to her polygamous citizens in Utah?‖137  
Blair bolstered his argument by appealing to American cases that had 
looked to the treatment of marriage by non-Western legal systems as 
evidence of a natural law unopposed to polygamy.
138
 In the years before 
the Civil War, a number of state courts had grappled with the legal status 
of Native American marriages, which courts regarded as potentially 
polygamous.
139
 While Indian tribes were in theory sovereign nations, the 
judges concluded that Native American marriages were entered into in ―a 
state of nature,‖ and the civil law would recognize them only so long as 
they did not violate natural law.
140
 Faced with a claim that the ease of 
 
 
AND DEMISE OF THE BRITISH WORLD ORDER AND THE LESSONS FOR GLOBAL POWER 118 (2002) 
(describing the relatively laissez-faire attitude that the British initially took toward sati). 
 134. See JOIS, supra note 131, at 31 (―[T]he whole of Hindu Law and Mohamedan Law 
concerning family and religious usages was fully respected by the Courts.‖). 
 135. CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 2D SESS. 1096–1100 (1872); see Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, 
Marriage and Redemption: Mormon Polygamy in the Congressional Imagination, 1862–1887, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 435, 483 (2009) (discussing Blair‘s political background).  
 136. See CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 2D SESS. 1097 (1872) (Rep. Blair) (discussing British 
imperial policy in India toward polygamy). 
 137. Id. British missionaries in India were eager to baptize Indians into Christianity. See 
FERGUSON, supra note 129, at 112–15 (recounting the genesis of missionary work by British 
Protestants in India). They seemed to realize, however, that given the widespread practice of polygamy 
on the subcontinent, requiring monogamy of all Indian Christians would reduce their pool of potential 
converts. Accordingly, they concluded on the basis of the Bible that polygamy was not inconsistent 
with Christianity. See CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 2D SESS. 1097 (1872) (discussing a meeting of 
Protestant ministers in Calcutta that concluded that polygamy did not violate the Bible or Christianity).  
 138. See id. at 1098 (citing state court cases dealing with Native American weddings). 
 139. See Johnson v. Johnson‘s Adm‘r, 30 Mo. 72, 86 (1860) (―[An Indian marriage] is also 
disannulled and the wife dismissed from the wigwam whenever the husband pleases, or the marital 
state is continued under the evils of discord or a state of polygamy.‖ (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
WILLIAM ROBERTSON, THE HISTORY OF AMERICA bk. 4 (1777))); Wall v. Williams, 11 Ala. 826, 828 
(1847) (―The [Choctaw] tribe had no written laws. They married and unmarried at pleasure—a man 
frequently having several wives.‖). 
 140. See Wall, 11 Ala. at 839 (―Marriages among the Indian tribes must be regarded as taking 
place in a state of nature . . . .‖); Morgan v. M‘Ghee, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 13, note (1844) (―The contract 
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divorce among Native Americans meant that their unions could not be 
recognized as binding as a matter of natural law, the Missouri Supreme 
Court asked rhetorically, ―To what quarter shall we look for proofs of the 
law of nature, if we exclude the manners and customs of the American 
aborigines?‖141 To be sure, these cases take a disparaging tone toward 
Native American customs, but in their willingness to see in them an 
instantiation of natural law, they hark back to the older tradition on which 
Reynolds‘s lawyers relied. Such arguments, however, proved to have little 
traction in the Mormon context, and Blair‘s bill attracted so little attention 
that no one even bothered to speak in opposition to it.
142
 It died without 
ever coming to a vote.
143
 
The more tolerant legal sensibility invoked by Blair was already 
anachronistic when he referenced it in 1872. From the early nineteenth 
century on, the English approach to the polyglot legal environment of 
India bears the stamp of progressive, reform-minded thinkers in England 
who saw law as an instrument through which they could ―civilize‖ Indian 
society.
144
 In 1833, Thomas Babington Macaulay was appointed as the 
Law Member of the Governor-General‘s Council and given the task of 
preparing a criminal code for India.
145
 The military chaos of the Great 
Mutiny delayed its final passage, but in 1860, the code was adopted.
146
 It 
played a key part in the campaign to eliminate ―suttee‖ and other forms of 
Indian ―barbarism.‖147 
 
 
of marriage is a stable and sacred contract of natural, as well as municipal, law.‖). 
 141. Johnson, 30 Mo. at 88. 
 142. See CONG. GLOBE, 42D CONG., 2D SESS. 1097 (1872) (reproducing Blair‘s speech in support 
of his bill with no response from other members of Congress). 
 143. See Phipps, supra note 135, at 484–87 (discussing the failure of Blair‘s bill). 
 144. V.D. KULSHRESHTHA, LANDMARKS IN INDIAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 226 
(B.M. Gandhi ed., 1995); see also, e.g., A.C. BANERJEE, ENGLISH LAW IN INDIA 169–70 (1984) 
(discussing Macaulay‘s complex relationship with Bentham and other English reformers). 
 145. See KULSHRESHTHA, supra note 144, at 226 (discussing the consolidation of British rule in 
India and the appointment of Macaulay). Prior to Macaulay‘s work, the criminal law administered in 
India was mainly of Muslim origin. Id. at 215–16. There were some areas of India that were not 
governed by Muslim law. See id. at 217–19. Prior to Macaulay‘s code the British had made piecemeal 
reforms of various aspects of the existing Muslim criminal law, generally by choosing to enforce rules 
espoused by minority Muslim jurisprudential schools rather than through outright legislation. See id. at 
221–24. 
 146. See PEN. CODE, No. 45 of 1860 (India). 
 147. According to one Indian commentator: 
[I]t . . . abated, if not extirpated, the crimes peculiar to India, such as thuggee, professional 
sodomy, dedicating girls to a life of temple-harlotry, human sacrifices, exposing infants, 
burning widows, burying lepers alive, gang robbery, torturing peasants and witnesses and 
sitting dharna. 
KULSHRESHTHA, supra note 144, at 227 (emphasis added). 
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In comparing ―suttee‖ to polygamy and the Mormons to Indians, the 
Court cast the federal government as an agent of civilization against 
barbarism, akin to the civilizing British imperialism under Macaulay in 
India. Within this imperialist jurisprudence, Reynolds‘s natural law 
arguments became incoherent and invisible, ―exceptions [not calling] for 
any remark.‖148 The arguments from the consensus gentium, on which his 
lawyers rested their claim that polygamy was not malum in se, looked to 
non-Western societies and legal systems as evidence of natural laws or 
their absence. In this sense, they took an optimistic and universalist view 
of human reason in which all societies, regardless of their cultural 
differences, would converge on eternal moral laws.
149
 In contrast to these 
earlier arguments, the Court laid emphasis on the concept of ―civilization,‖ 
understood in terms of the particular cultural apogee reached by the ―the 
northern and western nations of Europe,‖ in contrast to ―African and 
Asiatic‖ practices.150  
This racially charged rhetoric was typical of an age where ―Progress‖ 
had replaced ―Reason‖ as an ideological talisman and where imperialism 
was in full swing. It is not that the Court rejected the universalist 
aspirations of the earlier natural law tradition. Rather, those aspirations 
were transferred from a static vision of natural law to a more dynamic and 
aggressive vision of progressive civilization pitted against the forces of 
barbarism. In this narrative of violent evolution from barbarism to 
civilization, Mormons were cast—along with ―Asiatic and African‖151 
peoples—as a benighted race in need of civilizing imperial masters. 
III. THE AFTERLIFE OF THE IMPERIAL RHETORIC IN REYNOLDS 
Understanding the shift to imperial rhetoric in response to the natural 
law arguments in Reynolds sheds light on two major legal debates in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. Historians have long recognized that 
Reynolds ushered in successive rounds of increasingly harsh anti-
polygamy legislation in the 1880s, which ultimately culminated in the 
 
 
 148. Cf. Brief for the United States at 8, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (No. 108). 
 149. Cf. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 38–39 (1973) (―The notion of a 
consensus gentium (a consensus of all mankind)—the notion that there are some things that all men 
will be found to agree upon as right, real, just, or attractive and that these things are, therefore, in fact 
right, real, just, or attractive—was present in the Enlightenment and probably has been present in some 
form or another in all ages and climes.‖). 
 150. Cf. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
 151. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 150. 
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Mormon Church‘s public abandonment of polygamy in 1890.152 This story 
has been told most powerfully by Sarah Barringer Gordon, who interprets 
it as a final extension of the politics of anti-slavery and Reconstruction 
into the American West.
153
 The imperialist rhetoric in Reynolds, however, 
represented a strand of anti-polygamy rhetoric largely divorced from the 
humanitarian politics of anti-slavery. It was this rhetoric that allowed anti-
polygamy activists in the 1880s to negotiate the ultimate exhaustion of 
anti-slavery politics and the decline of Radical Reconstruction. The 
prominence of imperial analogies in the anti-polygamy debates of the 
1880s suggests that the federal suppression of polygamy can be seen not 
only as an extension of Reconstruction, but also as a harbinger of 
American imperial adventures in the final decade of the century. When 
America conquered Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines from Spain in 
1898, legal intellectuals grappled with the constitutional questions 
presented by the new territories by using analogies to British 
imperialism.
154
 In this debate, Reynolds and its progeny emerged as 
important precedents illustrating the extent of the Republic‘s imperial 
power. 
A. Imperialism and the Anti-Polygamy Crusade of the 1880s 
The Court‘s turn to imperialist imagery reflected shifting attitudes 
toward race within the Republican Party from which Chief Justice Waite 
and the other members of the Court were drawn.
155
 The Republican Party 
originally formed in the 1850s around the issue of excluding slavery from 
the territories.
156
 After the election of 1860 and the Civil War, Radicals 
within the party gained the upper hand and passed sweeping amendments 
 
 
 152. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 4, at 119–46 (discussing Reynolds and its aftermath); 
EDWARD LEO LYMAN, POLITICAL DELIVERANCE: THE MORMON QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 120–26 
(1986) (same). 
 153. See generally GORDON, supra note 4. 
 154. See generally Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the 
Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A 
DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (Christina 
Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). 
 155. At the time of Reynolds, seven of the nine Justices (Swayn, Miller, Strong, Bradley, Hunt, 
Waite, and Harlan) were Republicans, and of the two Democrats, one (Stephen Field) was a westerner 
appointed by Lincoln. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
81–82, 361–63, 417, 547–48, 845–46, 850–51, 906–07 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) 
(providing short biographies of the Justices). See generally PETER CHARLES HOFFER, WILLIAM JAMES 
HULL HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 131–58 (2007) 
(discussing the political make up of the Waite Court and its place in the politics of the 1870s). 
 156. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970). 
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to the Constitution, designed to eliminate slavery and ensure the equal 
rights of newly freed African Americans.
157
 After the war, the Radicals 
sought to ensure the reality of these goals by using federal power to 
suppress the political power of ex-Confederates and other whites hostile to 
racial equality in the South.
 158
 The central thrust of this movement was 
humanitarian. The Radical Republicans saw African Americans as victims 
of oppression to be saved by the federal government.
159
 In tandem with the 
politics of anti-slavery, anti-polygamy was initially another humanitarian 
mission aimed at the rescue of Mormon plural wives from the domineering 
force of their husbands, who were seen as akin to white slave owners.
160
  
The initial efforts to suppress polygamy, however, were anemic and 
ineffective. In 1870, the Radicals sought to put real teeth into federal anti-
polygamy policy in the Cullom Bill, which would have applied the tactics 
of Reconstruction to Utah.
161
 Participants in the debates over the bill 
explicitly located the issues within domestic narratives of rebellion and 
Reconstruction. For example, one opponent of the bill worried that ―[The 
Mormons] would regard the passage of this bill as a declaration of war 
. . . . Of course we could finally conquer them, because we could 
exterminate them. But it would cost us millions upon millions of treasure; 
it would cost us thousands upon thousands of lives.‖162 He went on: 
 The truth is that our system of government is unfit to deal with a 
problem such as the Mormon question presents. . . . If the people of 
any county tacitly agree that a particular crime shall not be 
considered a crime if committed within that county, what is to be 
done about it? . . . Cases of this character can be reached only by . . . 
 
 
 157. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. See 
generally MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, 
AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001). 
 158. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA‘S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877 (1989); Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 2020, 2060–64 (2009) (discussing some of the implementing legislation adopted by Congress to 
enforce the Reconstruction amendments). 
 159. See FONER, supra note 158, at 68 (―[T]he creation of the Freedmen‘s Bureau in March 1865 
symbolized the widespread belief among Republicans that the federal government must shoulder broad 
responsibility for the emancipated slaves, including offering them some kind of access to land.‖). 
 160. See GORDON, supra note 4, at 55–58 (cataloging political efforts to draw parallels between 
slavery and polygamy, which Republicans deemed the ―twin relics of barbarism‖). 
 161. See H.R. REP. No. 41-21 (1870); CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 2D SESS. 1367 (1870); see also 
Phipps, supra note 135, at 452–54 (discussing the legislative history and politics of the Cullom Bill). 
 162. CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 2D SESS. 1517 (1870) (Rep. Fitch). 
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the interposition of military rule. The remedy is expensive, and its 
frequent use most dangerous to republican government.
163
 
All of these arguments, of course, were being used at this time to justify 
the abandonment of Radical Republicanism. With his concern for the local 
power, the need to respect ―republican‖ practices, and the specter of 
military law in place of civil law, Representative Fitch might have been 
condemning Union practices in the defeated Confederacy rather than 
proposed federal policy in far-off Utah.
164
  
Proponents of the bill insisted that Utah deserved such tactics precisely 
because of the Mormon similarity to the defeated South. Utah, one 
congressman insisted, was like the territory ―south of Mason and Dixon‘s 
line‖ before ―slavery was abolished.‖165 He went on to insist that 
reluctance to use harsh measures against Mormon polygamists was part of 
a more general softening of attitudes toward the defeated South: 
I am sorry to see in this country the signs of a sickly sentimentality 
which proposes to punish nobody, which proposes to hang nobody, 
which proposes to let all the unchained passions of the human heart 
become free to prey upon mankind. We have seen too much of that 
in this day and generation. Had you hung one hundred traitors you 
would not have had rebellion in North Carolina and Tennessee to-
day.
166
 
By 1870, however, Radical Reconstruction was a waning political force, 
and the bill failed.
167 
Two years later, the Republican Party would split 
over the politics of Reconstruction, with the so-called Liberal Republicans 
nominating Horace Greely to run against Grant.
168
 While Grant was able 
to fend off Greely‘s challenge, ―[t]he 1872 campaign spelled the final 
collapse of Republican radicalism.‖169 
Nevertheless, anti-polygamy legislation thrived in the period following 
the decline of Radical Republicanism at least in part by abandoning 
domestic political narratives tied to the debates over slavery in favor of 
 
 
 163. Id. at 1518. 
 164. Cf. FONER, supra note 158, at 242–43 (discussing arguments employed by Democrats and 
moderate Republicans against the reconstruction tactics of the Radical Republicans in the defeated 
Confederacy). 
 165. CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 2D SESS. 2143 (1870) (Rep. Ward). 
 166. Id. at 2144. 
 167. See Phipps, supra note 135, at 461–64 (discussing the failure of the Cullom Bill to pass). 
 168. See FONER, supra note 158, at 499–511 (recounting the election of 1872). 
 169. DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 127 
(2001). 
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international, imperial analogies. During the campaign of 1872, for 
example, E.L. Godkin, the editor of The Nation and a leading voice of the 
Liberal Republicans, declared that ―‗Reconstruction . . . seems to be 
morally a more disastrous process than rebellion.‘‖170 Anti-polygamy 
legislation, however, managed to escape an analogous indictment of moral 
disaster, despite employing many of the same legal tactics as 
Reconstruction.
171
 The rhetoric exemplified in Vice President Colfax‘s 
speeches and the Reynolds decision helped to articulate a new vision of 
anti-polygamy for these post-Radical politics. Unlike the humanitarian 
rhetoric that first galvanized the Republican response to Mormonism, 
Colfax‘s narrative of polygamy did not center on the plural wife as a 
victim.
172
 Indeed, in contrast to the earlier vision of women as victims of 
fraud and kidnapping, Colfax brushed aside the question of whether plural 
wives consented to polygamy as essentially irrelevant.
173
 Rather, he 
insisted on the analogy to the British Raj where one nation exercised a 
right to dominate and coerce another nation by virtue of its superior 
civilization and the barbarism of the subordinate people.
174
 By nesting 
anti-polygamy in the international but nevertheless racialist narrative of 
imperialism, the Mormons could be subject to legal coercion without 
reopening the explosive domestic issue of race relations in the South, to 
say nothing of the delicate issue of the former Confederacy‘s status as a 
conquered territory.
175
  
 
 
 170. Id. at 123. 
 171. For the anti-polygamy legislation of the 1880s see Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882); 
Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887); see also FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 
161–67, 197–209 (discussing the passage and effects of the Edmunds Act and the Edmunds-Tucker 
Act); GORDON, supra note 4, at 151–55, 164–67 (same). 
 172. Colfax, supra note 122, at 15 (―I pass over the obvious argument that wherever polygamy 
prevails in the world woman occupies necessarily a degraded and inferior condition . . . .‖). 
 173. Id. (―The Brahmin reasoning that the woman consented (akin as it is to the Mormon 
argument now) had no effect. For England understood the power of religious fanaticism; of assumed 
revelation, of a potential public opinion.‖). 
 174. See generally Colfax, supra note 122. 
 175. Accompanying the attack on Radical Reconstruction was a set of racial narratives that 
replaced the domestic story of enslavement and emancipation with an international conception of 
barbarism and imperial civilization. In 1874, for example, the Shreveport Times attacked the political 
power that Radical Reconstruction conferred on freed blacks by appealing to the ―negro‖ tendency to 
―barbarism.‖ Citing English explorers in the vanguard of Victorian imperialism as authority, the paper 
argued for white supremacy: 
These plantation negroes, who to-day control the destiny of Louisiana, are fac similes of the 
natives of Central Africa, as described by Sir Samuel Baker . . . . This Englishman is the 
special friend of the negro and an advocate for universal emancipation. He informs the world 
that the negro is incapable of self-government; that he is constantly on the retrograde to 
barbarism, unless supported and upheld by the white man, and that a certain amount of 
compulsion is necessary to make him a useful member of society . . . . 
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The debates over the Edmunds Act of 1882
176
 illustrate the way that the 
imperial rhetoric invoked in Reynolds helped to midwife a new, harsher 
anti-polygamy policy. The Edmunds Act was important because it was the 
first anti-polygamy law that went beyond criminalizing Mormon marital 
and sexual conduct.
177
 Rather, it struck directly at Mormon political power 
in Utah by placing the territorial electoral machinery under the control of a 
presidentially appointed commission and excluding all polygamists from 
voting or holding public office.
178
 It thus represented the crossing of a 
threshold with important connections to the recent past of Reconstruction, 
when the federal government also aggressively intervened in local 
elections across the defeated Confederacy.
179
 The strength of the imperial 
analogy, however, proved sufficient to overcome any tainted association 
with the rejected politics of Radical Reconstruction. The potency of the 
imperialist rhetoric invoked by the Court in Reynolds is perhaps best 
illustrated by the person of Augustus Hill Garland.  
In 1866, Garland brought one of the earliest legal challenges to 
Reconstruction policies.
180
 Garland was a former member of the 
Confederate Senate, and a congressional act designed to exclude ex-
Confederates from public life through loyalty oaths kept him from 
returning to the practice of law.
181
 After a pardon by President Johnson in 
1865, he fought a case to the U.S. Supreme Court successfully challenging 
his continued exclusion from the bar.
182
 Notwithstanding this experience, 
 
 
Who Shall Deliver Us from the Body of Death?, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Sept. 14, 1874, reprinted in 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, USE OF THE ARMY IN CERTAIN SOUTHERN STATES, H.R. EXEC. 
DOC. NO. 44-30, at 372 (1953). The article goes on to discuss the racial views of Stanley and other 
famous explorers and agents of the British Empire. See id. at 372–74. Such attitudes gradually came to 
dominate in the North as well, where African Americans came to be seen as an ―un-American‖ 
intrusion into the body politic. See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: 
RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901, at 183–224 (2001) 
(discussing the widespread perception in the closing decades of the nineteenth century of African 
American laborers as un-American).  
 176. See Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882). 
 177. Compare Morrill Act, ch. 12, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (making bigamy a crime in federal 
territories), with Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (defining the crime of unlawful 
cohabitation). 
 178. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (restricting the voting and political rights of 
polygamists). 
 179. See generally David Buice, A Stench in the Nostrils of Honest Men: Southern Democrats and 
the Edmunds Act of 1882, DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT, Autumn 1988, at 100 (discussing 
ideological origins of opposition to the Edmunds Act by ex-Confederates and other Southerners). 
 180. See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866). 
 181. See id. at 336 (―Having taken part in the Rebellion against the United States . . . Mr. Garland 
could not take the oath prescribed by the acts of Congress before mentioned, and the rule of the court 
of March, 1865.‖). 
 182. See id. at 340 (―The President has fully pardoned him for this offence; and the constitutional 
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sixteen years later, Garland, now the U.S. Senator from Arkansas, took to 
the Senate floor to defend the Edmunds Act, emphatically endorsing 
complete federal control of the elective machinery in Utah.
183
 Senator Call 
of Florida objected to the bill using themes drawn from the Southern 
critique of Reconstruction.
184
 Senator Garland‘s reply is telling. His 
response to these politically potent post-Reconstruction claims was to 
explicitly invoke the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Reynolds, insisting that 
Congress must suppress ―crimes which the civilized world denounces.‖185 
He went on to bolster his argument with references to ―Professor Heeren‘s 
Historical Researches.‖186 The professor had ―published some seven 
volumes of his own travels and researches in Asia and other countries‖ 
that discussed, ―under the head of ‗Asia,‘‖ the evils of polygamy.187 In 
short, he rejected Senator Call‘s domestic objections based on local self-
government by appealing to a global imperial narrative about the 
superiority of the white race and the depraved practices of Asiatics. This 
imperial story proved powerful enough to displace his own vivid 
experience on the receiving end of similar tactics by the federal 
government.  
Interestingly, even those who attacked the Edmunds Bill did so using 
imperial analogies. For example, in contrast to Senator Call, who 
implicitly placed ―The Mormon Question‖ within a domestic framework 
of concern over the distribution of local and federal power, Senator Brown 
of Georgia saw the issue in terms of the dangers of imperial overreach and 
the need for civilized masters to accommodate the barbaric practices of 
their subjects, citing sources on how British authorities in India were 
forced to tolerate polygamy by the limits of imperial power.
188
 The 
 
 
effect of that pardon is to restore him to all his rights, civil and political, including the capacity or 
qualification to hold office, as fully in every respect as though he had never committed the offence.‖). 
 183. See 13 CONG. REC. 1159 (1882) (statement of Sen. Garland). 
 184. Id. at 1156 (statement of Sen. Call) (―[The bill] is an act which virtually declares that the 
President may give the whole political power of elections in the Territory of Utah to five persons 
nominated by himself and confirmed by the Senate. It seems to me that if there is anything in the 
institutions of this country and in the idea of self-government, that is a proposition which destroys the 
whole of it.‖). 
 185. Id. at 1159 (statement of Sen. Garland). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1202 (statement of Sen. Brown) (―England has had this same question to deal with. 
When she assumed the dominion of India she found polygamy there, and it has been there from time 
immemorial. They did not do what popular sentiment seeks to compel us now to do. The English 
people did not attempt to crush it out by law, but the British Parliament and the British courts 
recognize it in India on assuming control and recognize it to-day. Indeed they dare not do otherwise. 
They can enforce no law in India that proposes to exterminate polygamy.‖). 
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response of Senator Edmunds, the bill‘s sponsor, was to note limits to the 
tolerance of even the over-extended British. ―May I ask the Senator,‖ 
Edmunds interjected, ―if the same book contains a statement of the laws of 
Thibet, where one woman may lawfully marry several husbands, and all of 
them be bound to the marital relation?‖189 Even the Raj balked at 
tolerating polyandry, and the United States, he implicitly claimed, ought to 
have higher standards.  
Later, Edmunds enlarged on the imperial example by deliberately 
posing a hypothetical designed to distance the situation in Utah from that 
in the South: 
Would the Senator really object to a law, supposing it were not 
unconstitutional, (which is another question,) which said that no 
man should be entitled to participate in the government of the State 
of Georgia that was in the practice of having all his father‘s wives, 
one or more, burned, Hindoo fashion, when his father died?
190
 
Edmunds‘s rhetoric in this passage was subtle. It drew the sting of 
objections based on local self-government by raising the exotic 
hypothetical of ―suttee‖ in Georgia. So outlandish and foreign an image 
was meant to lay to rest concerns that heavy-handed federal tactics in Utah 
had anything to do with the now legitimized concern for local self-
government in the South. Utah was akin to India, not Georgia. To be sure, 
there continued to be some Southern opposition to deploying federal 
power against the Mormons, but unlike the Cullom Bill of 1870, the anti-
Mormon legislation of the 1880s—particularly after the successful passage 
of the Edmunds Act in 1882—was able to employ the legal tactics of 
Reconstruction without upsetting the consensus against the politics of 
Radical Republicanism.
191
 Reynolds thus represented the triumph of a set 
of rhetorical moves that situated polygamy in a global narrative of racial 
superiority that accommodated the rising force of Jim Crow by exoticizing 
the problem of Mormon polygamy, portraying its suppression as part of 
the onward march of the ―northern and western nations of Europe.‖192  
 
 
 189. Id. (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
 190. Id. at 1204 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
 191. See Phipps, supra note 135, at 480 (―Republicans in the 1880s displaced the sectionalism 
entrenched in earlier forms of anti-polygamy activism by claiming that a shared tradition of 
monogamy united the North and South.‖). 
 192. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). 
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B. Reynolds and Fin de Siècle American Imperialism 
Historians have traditionally ended the story of the anti-polygamy 
crusades in 1890, when the Mormon Church publicly abandoned plural 
marriage.
193
 The jurisprudential dialogue with international imperialism at 
work in Reynolds and the subsequent debates over the suppression of 
polygamy, however, continued in the final decade of the century. On 
February 15, 1898, the U.S.S. Maine exploded in Havana Harbor.
194
 Two 
months later, Congress declared war on Spain.
195
 Within six days, the 
American Asiatic Squadron under George Dewey engaged a Spanish 
squadron in Manila Bay.
196
 Within a month, American forces had 
occupied the archipelago, and on August 12, 1898, the United States and 
Spain agreed to a cease-fire.
197
 By that time, American forces had 
occupied not only the Philippines, but also Guam, Cuba, and Puerto 
Rico.
198
 All of these territories were subsequently ceded to the United 
States by Spain in the Treaty of Paris.
199
 
 
 
 193. As more recent historians have made clear, however, the 1890 cutoff date for battles over 
Mormon polygamy is not quite correct. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints continued the 
limited and clandestine practice of plural marriage until the first decade of the twentieth century, when 
the threat of renewed prosecutions during the controversy over the seating of Senator Reed Smoot, a 
monogamist Mormon leader, led the church‘s leadership to act decisively to end all new plural 
marriages. See generally KATHLEEN FLAKE, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: THE 
SEATING OF SENATOR REED SMOOT, MORMON APOSTLE (2004); D. Michael Quinn, LDS Church 
Authority and New Plural Marriages, 1890–1904, DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT, Spring 1985, at 
9. Since 1904, the church has automatically excommunicated any member who enters into a plural 
marriage. See Danel W. Bachman & Ronald K. Esplin, Plural Marriage, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
MORMONISM 1091, 1095 (Daniel H. Ludlow ed., 1992). Even thereafter, however, schismatic groups 
that repudiated the church‘s stance on plural marriage continued to practice polygamy. These 
schismatic groups, often referred to as ―Mormon fundamentalists,‖ continue today, over a century after 
the Mormon Church itself rejected the practice. See generally CARMON HARDY, SOLEMN COVENANT: 
THE MORMON POLYGAMOUS PASSAGE (1992) (discussing the roots and development of twentieth-
century polygamy in the western United States). 
 194. See DAVID TRAXEL, 1898: THE BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY 117–119 (1998) 
(discussing the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine). 
 195. See id. at 122 (discussing the congressional declaration of war against Spain). 
 196. See CRAIG L. SYMONDS, DECISION AT SEA: FIVE NAVAL BATTLES THAT SHAPED AMERICA 
141–95 (2006) (discussing the Battle of Manila Bay); Paul A. Kramer, Empires, Exceptions, and 
Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910, 8 J. AM. 
HIST. 1315, 1331 (2002) (discussing how the members of Manila‘s English Club watched the battle 
from the veranda of their clubhouse). 
 197. See Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Peace, Protocol of, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SPANISH-
AMERICAN AND PHILLIPINE-AMERICAN WARS 467 (Spencer C. Tucker ed., 2009) (discussing the 
cessation of hostilities between Spain and the United States). 
 198. See id. (discussing the territory that the United States took from Spain at the end of 
hostilities). 
 199. See Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, S. 
EXEC. DOC. No. 55-62, pt. 1 (1899); see also Paolo E. Coletta, McKinley, the Peace Negotiations, and 
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Just as American victory over a Spanish-speaking power had sparked 
an intense round of constitutional debate in the wake of the Mexican-
American War, the Spanish-American War launched an intense 
conversation over the nature of American expansion.
200
 The Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo had left the United States with sovereignty over a 
community—the Mormons—enmeshed in barbaric and ―Asiatic‖ practices 
that rendered them unfit for democratic self-government. The result was 
the transnational dialogue reflected in Reynolds. In the Mormon case, the 
―Asiatic‖ practice of polygamy had to be shed as a precondition for full 
integration into the American Union.
201
 The Spanish-American War 
confronted American law with a similar question but on a much larger 
scale.
202
 What was to be the status of the newly conquered Spanish 
colonies? Were they to be governed by the territorial model begun with the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, granted limited self-government, and 
admitted to the Union as states at some future point?
203
 Were they colonies 
of the American Republic, subject to the plenary authority of Congress for 
as long as it wished to exercise it?
204
 Did the Constitution ―follow the flag‖ 
into Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines?
205
 Once again, 
American legal intellectuals looked to British imperial models.
206
 
 
 
the Acquisition of the Philippines, 30 PAC. HIST. REV. 341, 348 (1961) (discussing the negotiations 
over the Treaty of Paris of 1898). 
 200. See Burnett & Marshall, supra note 154, at 3–17 (recounting the constitutional debate in the 
wake of the Spanish-American War). 
 201. Utah was admitted to the Union in 1896, decades after it had reached the level of population 
at which other territories were admitted as states. The reason for the delay, of course, was federal 
hostility to polygamy and other distinctive Mormon practices. See generally EDWARD LEO LYMAN, 
POLITICAL DELIVERANCE: THE MORMON QUEST FOR UTAH STATEHOOD (1986). 
 202. For a succinct summary of the debates, see Burnett & Marshall, supra note 154. See 
generally KERR, supra note 16 (discussing the constitutional debates over the status of the territory 
acquired from Spain in the Spanish-American War); SPARROW, supra note 16 (same). 
 203. See Burnett & Marshall, supra note 154, at 12 (discussing debates over the status of Puerto 
Rico in the context of the Northwest Ordinance). 
 204. See id. (discussing debates over Congress‘s claimed plenary authority over the newly 
acquired territories). 
 205. See Brook Thomas, A Constitution Led By the Flag: The Insular Cases and the Metaphor of 
Incorporation, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 82, 85 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (discussing the 
argument that ―the constitution follows the flag‖). 
 206. See, e.g., Lebbeus R. Wilfley, How Great Britain Governs Her Colonies, 9 YALE L.J. 207 
(1900) (examining the administration of the British Empire as a model for American law). According 
to Wilfley: 
The peculiar interest which attaches to the study of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain at 
the present time arises . . . . because the United States have recently acquired possessions, 
some of which are so far removed from our shores and are surrounded by such climatic, 
social, racial and religious conditions that they will have to be treated, for a time at least, as 
dependencies, before they can be incorporated into the Federal Union. 
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The debate began first in the pages of the then recently launched 
Harvard Law Review.
207
 Christopher Columbus Langdell and James 
Bradley Thayer argued that Congress could rule the new territories as 
subject colonies.
208
 They were opposed by Simeon Baldwin and Carman 
F. Randolph, who insisted that annexing Spanish possessions would 
necessarily entitle their inhabitants to all of the rights of United States 
citizens.
209
 Finally, Abbot Lawrence Lowell proposed an intermediate 
position, in which territories enjoyed more rights than those bestowed on 
European colonies, but not the full protection of the U.S. Constitution.
210
 
All of the protagonists examined the issues through the lens of British 
imperialism, and both sides invoked the legal suppression of polygamy in 
Utah as a precedent revealing the true nature of American power over 
conquered peoples.  
For example, Randolph insisted that plenary congressional authority 
over territories not incorporated into a state would unacceptably leave 
American ―‗colonists . . . in a state of the most complete subordination, 
and as dependent upon the will of Congress as the people of this country 
would have been upon the king and parliament of Great Britain, if they 
could have sustained their claim to bind us in all cases whatsoever.‘‖211 
Thayer‘s argument was equally nested in imperial narratives. The nation, 
he argued, could ―govern these islands as colonies, substantially as 
England might govern them; that we have the same power that other 
nations have.‖212 He went on to pair ―the entire recent history of England 
and of the United States‖ as examples of benevolent imperial 
administration.
213
 Strikingly, Thayer gave as examples of the ―wise and 
free colonial administration‖214 of the United States its control of the 
 
 
Id. at 207. He went on to gush that ―[t]he record of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain is a wonderful 
record; a tale of peace and war, of change, of enlargement, of unparalleled growth.‖ Id. 
 207. See Burnett & Marshall, supra note 154, at 5–7 (discussing the debates in the Harvard Law 
Review prior to the decision of the Court in the Insular Cases). 
 208. See generally C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365 
(1899); James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1899). 
 209. See generally Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition 
and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1899); Carman F. 
Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1898). 
 210. See generally Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions—A Third View, 
13 HARV. L. REV. 155 (1899). 
 211. Randolph, supra note 209, at 303 (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 360–61 (1826)). 
 212. Thayer, supra note 208, at 467. 
 213. Id. at 475. 
 214. Id. 
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territory conquered from Mexico.
215
 Here, he noted that ―[w]hatever 
restraints may be imposed on our congress and executive by the 
Constitution of the United States, they have not made impossible a firm 
and vigorous administration of government in the territories. Witness 
especially the case of . . . the Territory of Utah.‖216  
Lowell also conceptualized the nineteenth-century expansion of the 
United States across the continent in imperial terms. Writing in The 
Atlantic Monthly, he argued, ―there has never been a time, since the 
adoption of the first ordinance for the government of the Northwest 
Territory in 1784, when the United States has not had colonies.‖217 This 
fact was obscured for some, he went on to argue, because America‘s 
control over her colonies had been smooth and benign, ―[w]ith the 
exception of . . . the disturbances in Utah, where polygamy was a rock of 
offense.‖218 Like Thayer, he saw American westward expansion as a local 
species of the global genus of imperialism, with the Mormons serving as 
one of the points of contention that revealed the true relationship between 
the metropolitan center and its colonial periphery. The shift in anti-
polygamy politics midwifed by the imperial rhetoric in Reynolds lay just 
below the surface of these allusions. Thus, notably absent from this 
imperial conceptualization of the history of federal power was any 
discussion of Reconstruction. The exercise of federal authority in Utah 
was a form of benign imperialism, while the exercise of federal authority 
in the defeated South was passed over in discreet silence.  
Eventually, the argument shifted to the judiciary. In 1901, a series of 
disputes, collectively dubbed the Insular Cases, reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
219
 Although the facts and issues in the cases varied, they forced the 
Court to address the constitutional status of the new possessions 
conquered from Spain. The intricacies of the Court‘s reasoning and 
holding are beyond the scope of this Article.
220
 Suffice it to say that the 
intermediate position of Lowell triumphed in the Court‘s confused 
formulation that Puerto Rico and the other territories were ―foreign in a 
 
 
 215. Id. at 476. 
 216. Id. at 478. 
 217. A. Lawrence Lowell, The Colonial Expansion of the United States, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Feb. 1899, at 145, 145. 
 218. Id. at 146. 
 219. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 
183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v. New York, 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 
(1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 
(1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).  
 220. For a fuller discussion of the cases, see sources cited supra notes 16, 202. 
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domestic sense.‖221 Tellingly, Reynolds v. United States made an 
appearance in the arguments to the Court, where it was seen not as a 
precedent over the scope of religious freedom but rather as a case defining 
the scope of American imperial power.
222
  
Proponents of the theory that the Constitution applies fully and of its 
own force in all American territories looked to Reynolds as an example of 
the Bill of Rights‘s control, even over Congress‘s authority, beyond the 
territory of the organized states.
223
 In contrast, the Attorney General 
insisted that the Constitution had applied in Reynolds only because 
Congress had, in the exercise of its plenary power over conquered 
territories, chosen to extend its protections by statute in 1850.
224
 Relying 
on language from one of Reynolds‘s progeny, the Attorney General told 
the Court in oral argument: 
We plant ourselves squarely on the statement of this court in the 
Mormon Church case . . . that in legislating for Territories, 
Congress would be subject . . . [rather] by . . . the general spirit of 
the Constitution than by any express and direct application of its 
provisions.‖225  
To be sure, Reynolds and the other cases spawned by the anti-polygamy 
battles were not a major, let alone a causal, force in resolving the 
constitutional debates precipitated by the Spanish-American War. Their 
cameo appearance, however, shows the continuity between the earlier 
battles over polygamy and fin de siècle arguments over imperialism.  
 
 
 221. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341. 
 222. See Brief for Appellant, Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 143 (1900) (No. 509), in THE 
INSULAR CASES, COMPRISING THE RECORDS, BRIEFS, AND ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN THE INSULAR 
CASES OF THE OCTOBER TERM, 1900, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING 
THE APPENDIXES THERETO, H.R. DOC. NO. 56-4171, at 890 (1901) (―Congress is not omnipotent as to 
the Territories, We have in the Reynolds case, 98 U.S., 162, a decision of the Supreme Court that it is 
not omnipotent.‖); see also Brief for the United States, Goetze v United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1900) 
(No. 340), in THE INSULAR CASES, COMPRISING THE RECORDS, BRIEFS, AND ARGUMENTS OF 
COUNSEL IN THE INSULAR CASES OF THE OCTOBER TERM, 1900, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, INCLUDING THE APPENDIXES THERETO, H.R. DOC. 56-4171, at 220 (1901) (―[In 
Reynolds v. United States], Chief Justice Waite said: ‗By the Constitution of the United States 
(amendment 6), the accused was entitled to a trial by an impartial jury.‘ This was correct, in view of 
the fact that in 1850 the Constitution and laws of the United States, so far as applicable, were extended 
to the Territory of Utah.‖). 
 223. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 222, at 890. 
 224. See Brief for the United States, supra note 222, at 220. 
 225. Argument of the Attorney General, De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1900) (No. 456), in THE 
INSULAR CASES, COMPRISING THE RECORDS, BRIEFS, AND ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN THE INSULAR 
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The invocation of imperial models in both Reynolds and the Insular 
Cases was part of a much broader shift in late-nineteenth-century thinking, 
in which eighteenth-century narratives of universal rights were replaced by 
imperial narratives that centered on the potent ideas of race and progress. 
Early-nineteenth-century statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and John 
Quincy Adams had contrasted the virtue of republican America with the 
grasping European empires, while aggressively pushing the territorial 
expansion of the United States at the expense of Indian tribes and rival 
powers such as Spain, France, Britain, and Mexico.
226
 Late-nineteenth-
century Americans, however, were more willing to explicitly identify with 
Great Power imperialism.
227
 As the United States‘ commercial and 
military power expanded outward in the years after the Civil War, 
Americans increasingly found themselves in a world dominated by British 
imperialism.
228
 In the liminal spaces of empire such as the Philippines (a 
nominally Spanish colony dominated by English commercial interests) or 
Burma (a newly acquired frontier of the Indian Raj where American 
engineers successfully bid for government contracts), Americans abroad 
began identifying themselves with the triumphant Britons.
229
  
At home, many Americans came to see their own expansion as an 
expression of the wider story of European—and especially Anglo-
Saxon—migration to, and benign domination of, foreign territories and 
peoples.
230
 In his 1889 book, The Winning of the West, for example, 
Theodore Roosevelt told the story of westward expansion in the context of 
global Anglo-Saxon colonization.
231
 His book literally opens with the 
expansion of English legal models: 
 During the past three centuries the spread of the English-
speaking peoples over the world‘s waste spaces has been not only 
the most striking feature in the world‘s history, but also the event of 
all others most far-reaching in its effects and its importance. 
 
 
 226. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 25, at 111–16 (discussing John Quincy Adams‘s role in the 
acquisition of Florida and the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine). 
 227. See generally Kramer, supra note 196 (discussing American encounters with the British 
Empire and the effect on American understanding of American experience). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 1315 (―Along different timelines, pursuing varied agendas, and mobilizing diverse 
discourses to defend them, Americans from varied political backgrounds came to recognize that the 
United States‘ new colonial empire—part of its much vaster commercial, territorial, and military 
empires—operated within a larger network of imperial thought and practice.‖). 
 231. See generally 1 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WINNING OF THE WEST 1–31 (1889). See also 
Kramer, supra note 196, at 1325 (discussing the Winning of the West in the context of a broader stream 
of trans-Atlantic borrowing of imperialist ideologies).  
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 . . . The Common Law which Coke jealously upheld in the 
southern half of a single European island, is now the law of the land 
throughout the vast regions of Australasia, and of America north of 
the Rio Grande.
232
 
To be sure, Roosevelt insisted on a certain amount of American 
exceptionalism, but it was defined in relation to other imperial 
adventures.
233
 Likewise, under the influence of Harvard historian Henry 
Adams and European scholars like Henry Maine, Roosevelt‘s chief 
political ally, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, came to believe that the origins 
of American constitutionalism could be traced back through the story of 
the Anglo-Saxons to the tribes of ancient Germania.
234
 According to 
Lodge, the unique talent of the Anglo-Saxon race was their aptitude for 
law and self-government.
235
  
A corollary of this theory was that races unblessed with the Teutonic 
gift for administration were in need of benign Anglo-Saxon domination. 
Indeed, they were congenitally unfit for self-government without a long 
period of tutelage. Lodge insisted: 
You can not change race tendencies in a moment . . . . [The] theory, 
that you could make a Hottentot into a European if you only took 
possession of him in infancy and gave him a European education 
among suitable surroundings, has been abandoned alike by science 
and history as grotesquely false. . . . We know what sort of 
government the Malay makes when he is left to himself.
236
 
His conclusion was that the United States should exercise imperial control 
over ―lower‖ peoples without legal or constitutional scruple.237 Such 
 
 
 232. 1 ROOSEVELT, supra note 231, at 1. 
 233. For example, he noted with a touch of national pride that the Native Americans were ―the 
most formidable savage foes ever encountered by colonists of European stock. Relatively to their 
numbers, they have shown themselves far more to be dreaded than the Zulus or even the Maoris.‖ Id. 
at 17. 
 234. See Mark S. Weiner, Teutonic Constitutionalism: The Role of Ethno-Juridical Discourse in 
the Spanish-American War, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN 
EXPANSIONISM, AND THE CONSTITUTION 48 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) 
(discussing Lodge‘s constitutional views).  
 235. Id. at 57 (―‗[T]he laws and institutions of the ancient German tribes flourished and waxed 
strong on the soil of England. . . . Strong enough to resist the power of the church in infancy, stronger 
still to resist the shock of the Norman invasion, crushed then, but not destroyed, by foreign influence, 
the great principles of Anglo-Saxon law, ever changing and assimilating, have survived in the noblest 
work of the race—the English common law.‘‖ (quoting WAI-CHEE DIMOCK, EMPIRE FOR LIBERTY: 
MELVILLE AND THE POETICS OF INDIVIDUALISM 9 (1989)). 
 236. Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 33 CONG. REC. 2621 (1900)). 
 237. Id. at 63–75 (discussing the ―Progressive Anglo-Saxon Interpretation of the Insular Cases‖). 
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control was nothing more than the working out of America‘s destined part 
in the global and historical process of applying the Anglo-Saxon genius 
for government to a benighted world, a genius embodied in the United 
States Constitution.
238
 In this racially and historically charged vision of the 
Constitution, however, Mormons, Filipinos, and others who stood outside 
the story of Anglo-Saxon progress occupied a decidedly second-class 
status.
239
 
CONCLUSION  
As the Insular Cases were making their way to the Supreme Court, the 
popular McClure’s Magazine published an appeal by the poet laureate of 
British imperialism.
240
 Lest anyone mistake the topic of his poem, 
Rudyard Kipling subtitled it, ―The United States in the Philippine‘s 
Islands.‖241 ―Take up the White Man‘s burden,‖ he implored, calling on 
Americans, ―To wait, in heavy harness, / On fluttered folk and wild— / 
Your new-caught sullen peoples, / Half devil and half child.‖242 The 
rhetorical invitation of the poem was clear. America, Kipling in effect 
argued, needed to see itself in modern imperial terms and adopt the ―dear-
bought wisdom‖ of its international peers.243 The poetic appeal, however, 
had already been foreshadowed in a legal appeal more than twenty years 
 
 
 238. Id. 
 239. In this regard, it is worth noting that one of the ―bones of contention‖ between the Mormons 
and the federal government was the Latter-day Saints‘ hostility to the common law courts. Nineteenth-
century Mormons sought to bypass these courts by resolving their civil disputes in ecclesiastical 
courts. See generally Oman, supra note 119, at 212–14. One anti-Mormon critic writing in 1904 
compared the Mormons to the ―Chinese highbinders of San Francisco‖ who similarly eschewed the 
common law courts because ―[t]hey . . . could not more appreciate what we think is civilization than 
they could fly.‖ See id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Public Against Apostle 
Smoot: Opposed by Sentiment of Country, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 20, 1904, at 2). 
 240. See Rudyard Kipling, The White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippines 
Islands, MCCLURE'S MAG., Feb. 1899, at 4; see also THE COLLECTED POEMS OF RUDYARD KIPLING 
334 (Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1994) (containing Kipling‘s subtitle to the work). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. The final stanza of the poem reads: 
Take up the White Man's burden! 
Have done with childish days— 
The lightly-proffered laurel, 
The easy ungrudged praise: 
Comes now, to search your manhood 
Through all the thankless years, 
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom, 
The judgment of your peers. 
Id. 
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earlier, when Reynolds‘s lawyers rose before the Court armed with 
arguments about natural law, only to be defeated by the more powerful, 
progressive myth that Kipling ultimately set to verse. Where Reynolds‘s 
lawyers had seen in the diversity and unity of human laws an organon for 
discovering immutable natural laws, the Court saw barbarism. In the 
Justices‘ vision, the Mormons were among the ―sullen peoples, / Half 
Devil and half child,‖ who, like ―African and Asiatic‖244 populations, 
needed a firm imperial hand. The appeal to non-Western culture had gone 
from defense to indictment. 
As the voice of the losers in the case, it is fitting to close this Article by 
returning to George Q. Cannon. While the arguments that he penned in his 
Review almost certainly had their genesis with the decidedly non-Mormon 
George Biddle, Cannon adopted them into the narrative that he directed 
inward, toward the Mormon community that would shortly reap the 
whirlwind of their 1879 defeat in Reynolds. He wrote: 
Not the least of the considerations which prompt me in this review, 
is that I desire that all the people of my faith may know that we 
have not been deceived in our ideas respecting the Constitution and 
our rights under it; that if we are to be stricken down . . . it shall not 
be in ignorance nor in doubt as to the wrongfulness of the blows 
from which we suffer; that our children may know that we fell 
contending for constitutional rights, liberty of conscience for 
ourselves and all others . . . .
245
 
The Court‘s appeal to imperial models did not go unnoticed. Cannon was 
born an Englishman. He immigrated to America after joining the Mormon 
Church, and, at one point, his political opponents dogged him with the 
accusation that he was never naturalized as a U.S. citizen and remained a 
British subject, making him ineligible for his office as territorial 
delegate.
246
 There is thus a biographical irony in his response to the 
Court‘s invocation of the British Raj. After recounting the Court‘s reliance 
on analogies to ―Suttee‖ and ―Thugee,‖ Cannon turned to a different story 
about British imperial power: 
I was taught to look upon the experience which the [American] 
colonies underwent in the suffering of wrongs, in the endurance of 
 
 
 244. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). 
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oppression, in the struggles for religious and political liberty, as a 
preparatory training to enable them to value, contend for and 
achieve independence. I was taught that the firmness, valor and 
undaunted cheerfulness, hope and confidence of Washington, and 
. . . the Adamses, Franklin, Jefferson, and Madison . . . were due to 
the direct blessing and inspiration of Heaven bestowed upon 
them.
247
 
Against the Court‘s admiring analogy to nineteenth-century British 
imperialism, Cannon thus responded with the story of eighteenth-century 
British imperialism and the divine sanction for its defeat. As the Court‘s 
opinion in Reynolds itself demonstrates, Jefferson and Madison were 
names to conjure with, but in Cannon‘s argument, they proved 
insufficient. The eighteenth-century imperialism on whose opprobrium he 
traded lacked a connection to the potent contemporary rhetoric of race and 
barbarism. Universal reason had been replaced by progress and the white 
man‘s burden.  
 
 
 247. CANNON, supra note 44, at 5. 
 
